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ABSTRACT 
THE EFFECTS OF LANGUAGE COMPLEXITY ON NATURAL AND EMOTION 
CONCEPT FORMATION IN EARLY LANGUAGE LEARNERS 
by Stephanie Eileen Jett 
December 2014 
 The present study investigated the role of language complexity in natural and 
emotion concept formation ability in young children (two- to five-year-olds). Language 
complexity was measured by selections from the Brigance Diagnostic Inventory of Early 
Childhood Development II, and concept formation was assessed at three levels of 
abstraction. The natural concepts were presented as two alternative discriminations on a 
touch-screen computer, as follows: subordinate level (lions versus tigers), basic level 
(cats versus dogs), and superordinate level (animals versus nonanimals). The following 
emotion categories were discriminated: subordinate level (anger versus sadness), basic 
level (positive [happiness and positive surprise] versus negative [anger and sadness], and 
superordinate level (emotions [happiness, surprise, anger, and sadness] and neutral faces).  
It was predicted that higher language complexity scores would be related to higher 
performance on the concept discrimination tasks.  Results showed no support for the 
language as an augmenter hypothesis, providing some support for the assertion that 
concept formation is an innate ability, not dependent upon language. Additionally, there 
was no support found for the Circumplex model of emotion recognition with performance 
on the subordinate and superordinate level of abstraction tasks exceeding that on the 
basic level discrimination.  Interestingly, results indicated that females outperformed 
males on the emotion concept discriminations, suggesting possible differences in 
  iii 
socialization between male and female children and/or an evolutionary predisposition for 
females to interpret facial expressions more accurately than males from an earlier age. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 Humans exist in a highly complex perceptual environment and are constantly 
exposed to information that must be processed. In the case of infants and very young 
children, the vast majority of information encountered is novel and must be processed 
and stored in memory for later use. Familiar, as well as novel, information is organized 
into units in order to reduce the amount of information that has to be processed, stored, 
and later recalled; these units are termed concepts (Rosch, Mervis, Gray, Johnson, & 
Boyes-Braem, 1976). Concepts are mental representations of information formed during 
the process of categorization.  
 One mechanism that has been hypothesized to underlie the sorting of information 
into groups during categorization is of the analysis of shared features. These features 
could be observable, such as common physical features, or unobservable, such as warm 
versus cold-blooded. The concepts that result from the process of categorization could be 
physical concepts, which include natural categories (e.g., animals), or social concepts, 
such as concepts for processing and detecting emotions. The exact manner in which these 
concepts are formed and utilized by the organism has remained a topic of interest for the 
past several decades (Gelman & Markman, 1987; Markman & Wisniewski, 1997; Quinn 
& Tanaka, 2007; Rosch, 1975; Rosch et al., 1976). 
Language Affects Cognition 
 Language has been suggested to influence concept formation throughout 
development (Davidoff, 2001; Gelman & Coley, 1990; Gelman & Markman, 1987; 
Mandler, 1992; Plunkett, Hu, & Cohen, 2008; Russell & Widen, 2002; Yoshida & Smith, 
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2005; Zhang & Schmitt, 1998) and is a mechanism by which highly complex cognitive 
abilities are molded and made possible (Wolff & Holmes, 2011; Zhang & Schmitt, 1998). 
Wolff and Holmes (2011) point out that although it is currently recognized and accepted 
that thought is a separate entity from language (that is, they are not inextricably linked), 
the extent to which language shapes thought is still highly debated (Davidoff, 2001; 
Franklin, Clifford, Williamson, & Davies, 2005; Majid, Bowerman, Kita, Haun, & 
Levinson, 2004; Plunkett et al., 2008; Russell & Widen, 2002; Saalbach & Imai, 2007). 
Sapir-Whorf Hypothesis 
 One popular hypothesis that seeks to explain the role of language in cognition is 
the Sapir-Whorf Hypothesis. Originally, this hypothesis suggested that the language one 
speaks governs how that person thinks, making some ways of thinking possible and some 
impossible depending upon the structure of the language one speaks. In other words, 
language determines cognition, implying that cultures that speak different languages will 
think inherently differently. This version of the hypothesis has become known as 
Linguistic Determinism and is considered the strong version (Wolff & Holmes, 2011).  
 Evidence supporting this approach comes from work with human infants showing 
that, up until the age of approximately six months, infants can recognize and distinguish 
all phonemes present in all languages. However, between the ages of six to nine months, 
this ability begins to disappear and is completely gone by the age of approximately 
twelve months. The child is left with the ability to distinguish and recognize only the 
phonemes present in their native language (Werker & Desjardins, 1995). This auditory 
specialization alludes to the possible importance of the language that one is exposed to 
before being capable of producing language. 
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 Further support for linguistic determinism has been found in research involving 
the categorization of colors. Davidoff (2001) found that the categorization of colors 
differed between speakers of English and Berinmo (Papua New Guinea). These results 
suggest that the linguistic terms used for different colors in a particular culture can affect 
how we categorize colors, perhaps even how we perceive colors (Davidoff, 2001). 
However, the empirical support for Linguistic Determinism is not conclusive. Many 
argue that language may have an impact on thought, but its role is less deterministic and 
more augmentative in nature (Wolff & Holmes, 2011). 
 A weaker version of the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis, the Linguistic Relativity 
Hypothesis (LRH), has gained more empirical support. The LRH suggests that language 
shapes thought by making some ways of thinking easier and some more difficult based 
on the structure of the language one speaks (Lindquist, Barrett, Bliss-Moreau, & Russell, 
2006). LRH and Linguistic Determinism differ in that the strong version comes very 
close to stating that thought is impossible without language and the LRH simply dilutes 
Linguistic Determinism. The LRH implies that, while thought may be possible without 
language, this form of thought is inherently different than thought that occurs with 
language. However, the LRH still implies that speakers of different languages inherently 
think and perceive the world differently (Zhang & Schmitt, 1998). Empirical support for 
the LRH has been reported in research on color categorization and perception (Masharov 
& Fischer, 2006; Thierry, Athanasopoulos, Wiggett, Dering, & Kuipers, 2009; Winawer 
et al., 2007), spatial frames of reference (Gallistel, 2002; Majid et al., 2004), concepts of 
time (Boroditsky, 2001), numerical processing (Pixner, Moeller, Hermanova, Nuerk, & 
Kaufmann, 2011), and most importantly for the current project, categorization and 
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concept formation ( Gelman & Markman, 1987; Plunkett et al., 2008; Yoshida & Smith, 
2005; Zhang & Schmitt, 1998) and the perception of emotion (Lindquist et al., 2006; 
Russell & Widen, 2002; Widen & Russell, 2003).  
 Wolff and Holmes (2011) suggest, however, that the interaction between language 
and thought is more complex than can be explained by just a strong or weak version of 
the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis. The authors assert that whereas Linguistic Determinism has 
not been empirically supported, several other manifestations of the LRH have been 
hypothesized with reasonable supporting evidence to be discussed in the following 
sections.  
Thought with and after language 
 Despite the lack of empirical support for Linguistic Determinism and the debates 
regarding the role of language in shaping thought, it would be difficult to consider the 
idea that language plays no role at all in shaping human cognition. If language provided 
no benefit or advantage, the mechanisms to produce and comprehend it would likely not 
have been preserved in the evolution of the species, nor would they continue to be 
utilized by human cultures. Wolff and Holmes (2011) suggest that thought occurs both 
with and after language. Thought with language occurs when thought and language work 
simultaneously, or online. Whereas, thought after language occurs when language directs 
attention (e.g., priming) to relevant aspects of the environment or influences the type of 
processing utilized during tasks, even if the tasks are nonverbal in nature (Wolff & 
Holmes, 2011).  
 As depicted in Figure 1, when thought is occurring after language, there are two 
proposed roles that language could play: language as a spotlight and language as an 
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inducer (Wolff & Holmes, 2011). In a perceptual world as complex as the one in which 
humans exist, language may function to highlight certain relevant features in order to 
help reduce the amount of information that is necessary to process at one time. In this 
role, language may act as a spotlight to aid in focusing attention to aspects of the 
environment made more salient by the exposure to and use of a language. Supporting 
evidence for this role of language has been demonstrated in research regarding how 
language affects spatial frames of reference and relations (Wolff & Holmes, 2011). For 
instance, English speakers emphasize the difference between prepositions indicating 
support (e.g., The lamp was placed on the table) and those indicating containment (e.g., 
The lamp was placed in the box). In contrast, Korean speakers emphasize the distinction 
between tight and loose fit in their placement verbs while the distinction between 
containment and support is irrelevant. Interestingly, like phoneme sensitivity early in 
infancy, very young infants in both cultures are sensitive to all distinctions but become 
more specialized as they are exposed to their native languages, suggesting language 
acting as a spotlight to draw attention to the relevant spatial distinctions for their 
language (Choi, 2006).  
 In addition, varying linguistic descriptions of an object’s position relative to 
another object has been shown to lead to differences in non-linguistic representations 
(e.g., gestures) of these spatial relationships from culture to culture (Gallistel, 2002; 
Majid et al., 2004). For instance, speakers of a language who would describe the position 
of a building as to the right of a statue differ in the way that they would non-linguistically 
demonstrate (e.g., by gesturing) where the building was in relation to the statue, 
compared to speakers of a language who predominantly would use a frame of reference 
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stating that the building was north of the statue (depending upon cardinal direction) 
(Majid et al., 2004). However, that is not to say that the way in which one’s language 
refers to spatial relationships makes thinking in any other frame of reference impossible. 
Language is in this case acting as a spotlight, making certain ways to view the spatial 
world easier than others (Gallistel, 2002). 
 Language is also hypothesized to act as an inducer, making one type of 
processing preferred over another when confronted with a task. Wolff and Holmes (2011) 
suggest that “language may prime a particular mode of processing that continues to be 
engaged even after language is no longer in use” (p. 260). In other words, language may 
act at an unconscious level that shapes how speakers perceive their environment (Thierry 
et al., 2009). Though most often research on color perception is spoken of in regard to 
language acting with thought in an online sense, recent findings suggest that the language 
one speaks functions to induce early, low-level perception of colors. Thierry and 
colleagues (2009) found that, for native Greek speakers, the cortical response (visual 
mismatch negativity) that is an indicator of preattentive (unconscious) change detection 
was greater for discriminating between light and dark blue. The authors suggest that this 
effect is due to the existence of two color terms in the Greek language that refer to that 
discrimination. In contrast, native English speakers did not show this cortical response, 
indicating that the existence of the two color terms in the Greek language acted as an 
inducer for detecting the differences between the colors for native Greek speakers, even 
when those terms were not being consciously utilized. 
 Additional evidence for language as an inducer comes from research on how time 
is conceptualized by speakers of differing languages. When speakers of Mandarin 
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Chinese were asked to confirm if a target month came before a comparison month (e.g., 
March before April), they were quicker to do so if they had seen an array of objects 
aligned vertically, which matches how they typically conceptualize time, versus if the 
array of objects was aligned horizontally, which is how English speakers typically 
conceptualize time. The opposite is true for English speakers, suggesting that the way in 
which someone typically speaks can influence how someone thinks about abstract 
concepts like time (Boroditsky, 2001). These results, however, have been heavily 
criticized due to the fact that they have failed to replicate in Mandarin/Chinese and 
English speakers using the same methods (January & Kako, 2007) or similar (Tse & 
Altarriba, 2008). Similar results have been shown in nonverbal number processing in 
young children (German versus English speakers), suggesting that the processing of place 
values in non-verbal, digital representations of numbers is nonetheless affected by the 
way in which the number words system is structured (Pixner et al., 2011). Like the 
findings regarding spatial relationships, the suggestion that nonverbal numerical 
processing is shaped by language has also been challenged. Brysbaert, Fias, and Noel 
(1998) found that when modality of response is controlled (verbal versus typed), the 
differences between languages disappear. 
 Though some of the evidence for the language after thought hypothesis is 
controversial, there are additional ways in which language has been suggested to shape 
thought when the two are working in tandem – thought with language. For example, 
Wolff and Holmes (2011) suggest that language may work with thought in two ways 
(refer to Figure 1): language as a meddler and language as an augmenter. In these two 
hypothesized roles, language can both help (augment) and/or hinder (meddle with) 
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cognition. When language acts as a meddler, linguistic codes interfere in some way with 
non-linguistic codes, affecting the way in which one perceives the environment (e.g., 
color-perception). From a Whorfian perspective, even aspects of perception that one 
would assume to be relatively universal and biological in nature, such as color-
perception, are affected by one’s language at each stage in the process. Therefore, 
without a word for a specific color or shade of a color, it is possible that the observer 
does not in fact perceive the color in the same manner that a person with a specific label 
for that hue does. These results have been demonstrated by several researchers (Davidoff, 
2001; Davies, Sowden, Jerrett, Jerrett, & Corbett, 1998; Masharov & Fischer, 2006; 
Winawer et al., 2007), indicating that the number of available color terms in one’s 
language has an effect on the color discrimination of the speakers of the languages.  
 The above results suggest that the linguistic codes present in one’s language 
meddle with the non-linguistic perception of colors (Wolff & Holmes, 2011). However, 
these findings may not fully reflect the breadth of the issue. The effects of language could 
have more of an impact only later in life, after significant exposure to one’s native 
language, and have less of an effect earlier in life (Franklin et al., 2005). Whereas 
language appears to indeed shape the way in which individuals perceive color, there also 
exist universal properties of colors (e.g., light and dark) that allow for overlap among 
speakers of differing languages, demonstrated by a similar number of basic color terms 
across many languages (Claidiere, Jraissati, & Chevallier, 2008; Kay & Reiger, 2006). 
 Lastly, the augmenter hypothesis implies that language in this role supplements 
and/or aides thought by providing additional conceptual frameworks by which mental 
operations can occur. In essence, language becomes a tool for thought. This role of 
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language is of most importance to this proposal due to the function of language in the 
formation of concepts in humans (Wolff & Holmes, 2011). Language has been implicated 
as the game changer for categorical perception in that it highlights commonalities 
between members of a category that can be both observable (e.g., perceptual similarities) 
and/or unobservable (e.g., internal structures or emotional states) and facilitates concept 
formation by providing the organizational, anchoring structure (words) upon which a 
concept can be built (Gelman & Markman, 1987; Plunkett et al., 2008; Zhang & Schmitt, 
1998). For instance, speakers of languages that utilize nominal classifier systems 
(classifies nouns into over 100 semantic categories), such as Chinese, categorize objects 
differently than speakers of languages that do not use this system (e.g., utilize shared 
perceptual features). Chinese speakers grouped objects based on the structure of the 
classifier system (grouping objects together that shared a common classifier), whereas 
English speakers did not, suggesting that language facilitated the categorization of the 
objects for the Chinese speakers (Zhang & Schmitt, 1998). Labels have even been 
deemed capable of overriding perceptually based concepts in early language learning 
humans, which provides evidence for the augmenting, and potentially meddling, role 
language can play in concept formation (Plunkett et al., 2008).  
 Beyond perceptual categorization, however, language is proposed to play a 
pivotal role in the formation and understanding of social concepts, such as theory of mind 
and emotional understanding (e.g., Astington & Jenkins, 1999; de Rosnay, Pons, Harris, 
& Morrell, 2004; Lindquist et al., 2006; Russell & Bullock, 1985; Russell & Widen, 
2002; Watson, Painter, & Bornstein, 2000) due to the inherent internal nature of mental 
state attribution. Whereas forming a concept for a subordinate level natural category, 
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such as tigers, may be relatively straightforward due to the fact that members of that 
category share common observable perceptual features (e.g., stripes), forming a concept 
for mental states presents an obstacle because the characteristics that discriminate one 
from another are not always reliably displayed externally.  
 Theory of mind is the understanding that others possess knowledge, intentions, 
opinions, and feelings that can differ from those of the self. The development of this 
ability has been linked to linguistic ability in young children, with those who are more 
advanced linguistically early in development possessing more advanced theory of mind 
capabilities later in childhood compared to others in their age groups (Astington & 
Jenkins, 1999; Watson et al., 2000). This relationship is especially true for the 
understanding of false beliefs, perhaps due to the inherently embedded structure of a false 
belief statement (e.g., I know X is really true, but she thinks Y). The understanding of 
such statements could be facilitated by knowledge and understanding of the grammatical 
structure (syntax) of one’s language (Wolff & Holmes, 2011). 
 Of marked importance to the current project is the potential effect of language on 
the development of emotion understanding and recognition, specifically. Emotions are 
internal, psychological states, which create a challenge in terms of studying how emotion 
concepts are formed and how emotions are recognized by early language learners. For 
humans, one way in which this challenge may be overcome is by utilizing facial 
expressions to determine emotional states. Facial expressions are interpreted by 
perceivers as outward, externalized expressions of internal emotional states. Both a cross-
cultural, innate, universality of emotion recognition hypothesis (e.g., Ekman, 1993; Izard, 
1994; Waller, Cray, & Burrows, 2008) and a LRH explanation of emotion recognition 
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(e.g., Lindquist et al., 2006; Russell & Widen, 2002) have been explored with support for 
both a universal and relativistic approach to emotion recognition. The suggested role of 
language as an augmenter in this case, however, is hypothesized as providing a label for 
unobservable or difficult to discriminate emotional states (Russell & Bullock, 1985; 
Russell & Widen, 2002). 
 If language and thought are as deeply connected as the aforementioned findings 
suggest, then the question still remains as to what it is about language that causes 
language to exert influence on cognitive abilities. The affected abilities could include 
emotion recognition and natural concept formation, especially in early language learners. 
Human language is a complex system of communication that is comprised of 
significantly more than merely producing and understanding individual words in 
isolation. This fact alludes to not only the potential role of both expressive and receptive 
language, but also to the role of other aspects of language (e.g. grammatical competency 
and practical use/comprehension of language) in affecting the way in which one 
perceives and thinks about the world. Additionally, is language necessary for concept 
formation or does it simply help anchor concepts when it is present and is therefore only 
a sufficient condition for concept formation? Exploring such questions first necessitates 
the discussion of the theoretical and developmental bases of both natural and emotion 
concept formation. 
Natural Concept Formation 
 Concepts are defined as mental representations of information utilized to reduce 
the amount of information that needs to be processed, stored, and later recalled. These 
concepts are formed during the process of categorization. Categories can either be well-
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defined or ill-defined in terms of their structures. Well-defined categories, such as 
experimentally derived categories, are characterized by possessing a “set of separately 
necessary and jointly sufficient features” that distinguish one category from another 
(Bhatt, Wasserman, Reynolds, & Knauss, 1988, p. 219). Needless to say, these types of 
clearly organized categories are rarely found in nature. Natural categories, unlike well-
defined categories, have what are termed as fuzzy boundaries, meaning that there is 
considerable overlap between and among categories, therefore, making natural categories 
ill-defined (Bhatt et al., 1988). The fact that natural categories (e.g., animals) do not have 
clear-cut boundaries creates unique challenges for the process of forming concepts for 
these types of categories. The following sections will describe the theories of conceptual 
structure, the order in which the different levels of concepts emerge, the information very 
young children utilize as a basis upon which to form concepts, and finally, a discussion 
on the hypothesized role that language plays in the formation and organization of natural 
concepts. 
Concept Theory 
 Concepts are utilized to reduce the amount of information regarding category 
membership that needs to be processed, stored, and retrieved. The way in which 
organisms structure these concepts has been a topic of interest for decades due to the fact 
that natural categories, such as animals or plants, are ill-defined (Gelman & Markman, 
1987; Markman & Wisniewskie, 1997; Quinn & Tanaka, 2007; Rosch, 1975; Rosch et 
al., 1976). So, how do we structure concepts for natural categories? One of the most 
popular views is that concepts are formed in a hierarchical manner based on what have 
been termed levels of abstraction (Rosch et al., 1976).  
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 Rosch’s levels of abstraction. Rosch and colleagues (1976) proposed that natural 
categories are organized around three levels of abstraction, from least to most inclusive: 
subordinate, basic, and superordinate. The three levels are differentiated by level of 
between and within category inclusiveness, or similarity. It is of importance to note that a 
natural object can be represented at all three levels of abstraction at once; for example, a 
Golden Retriever is simultaneously represented at the superordinate level of animal, the 
basic level of dog, and the subordinate level of its own breed. This ability to flexibly 
categorize an object at multiple levels of abstraction has been suggested as a hallmark of 
human conceptual abilities (Lazareva, Frieburger, & Wasserman, 2004). Subordinate 
level categories, being the most exclusive level, have a high degree of both within and 
between category similarities (Markman & Wisniewski, 1997; Rosch et al., 1976). For 
example, a single breed of dog (e.g., Golden retriever) would be considered to be a 
subordinate level category. Two breeds of dogs, for example a Golden retriever and 
Border collie (two subordinate level categories), share many attributes both within and 
between the subordinate categories.  
 In contrast, superordinate level categories are considered the most inclusive 
categories. Superordinate categories, such as animals, share few common attributes both 
within and between categories. For example, both a grasshopper and a Golden retriever 
belong to the same superordinate category of animal, but share very few observable 
features in common. In addition, between superordinate categories, such as animals and 
plants, there are even fewer shared attributes. This level of abstraction has been suggested 
to be the level at which true conceptual knowledge regarding category membership is of 
utmost importance to the formation of the concept, relative to subordinate categories 
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formed on the basis of shared perceptual features (Vonk & MacDonald, 2002, 2004), 
although others have argued that categories can be discriminated on a perceptual basis 
due to the between category dissimilarity (Mandler, 1992; Quinn, 2002; Quinn & Eimas, 
1996). More details regarding this argument will be provided in a later section. 
 Basic level categories balance low between category similarity and an 
intermediate level of similarity within categories (Markman & Wisniewskie, 1997; Rosch 
et al., 1976). As an example, exemplars within the basic level category of dogs share 
many common features within the category, such as head shape, body structure, etc. If 
compared to another basic level category of cats, for example, there are fewer attributes 
in common than within the two categories, therefore making the two categories highly 
differentiated despite being members of the same parent superordinate category of 
animals. 
  Basic level categories have also been suggested to be the most economical in 
terms of cognitive resources due to the fact that they possess the most information needed 
to differentiate between objects without containing extra, unnecessary information 
(Rosch et al., 1976). In explanation, when one moves from a basic to a subordinate level 
category, there is little information gained from that differentiation, as determined by the 
fewer number of novel facts that can be named for a subordinate level category (e.g., 
Golden retriever) compared to its parent basic level category (e.g., dog). The little 
information that is gained (e.g., hair color and length or body size), however, is important 
for distinguishing among members of a basic level category.  
 Along the same vein, when one moves from a basic to a superordinate level 
category, the increase in information is not as useful for determining category 
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membership in comparison to the information used to describe the basic level categories. 
While there is a significant amount of overlap among the characteristics that can be used 
to describe animals, dogs, and specific instances of dogs (e.g., they all eat, breathe, 
reproduce, etc.), more novel, specific information can be used to describe the basic level 
category (dogs) than the subordinate (Golden retriever) or superordinate (animals) level 
categories. These assertions regarding the practicality of basic level categories have led to 
the proposition that these categories are cognitively privileged. Following Rosch and 
colleagues’ (1976) differentiation view, the other levels of abstraction are derived from 
basic level categories - subordinate levels are formed by breaking down basic level 
categories and superordinate levels are created by grouping together basic level 
categories. Basic level categories have been suggested to emerge first in development, 
and the labels for members have been shown to be learned and used first by early 
language learners (Rosch et al., 1976). 
 Alignable differences view. As popular as the differentiation view has been since 
its first proposal, there are some who assert that this view is underspecified. Critics assert 
that Rosch and colleagues (1976) emphasized the commonalities between and among 
category members too much and neglected what Markman and Wisniewskie (1997) 
propose as alignable differences. Alignable differences arise from shared features of 
category members. For a simple example using vehicles, Markman and Wisniewskie 
(1997) stated that the fact that most vehicles, with exceptions, have wheels as a 
commonality, but the fact that cars have four wheels and motorcycles have two is an 
alignable difference. They suggest that these alignable differences play a major role in 
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distinguishing between members of categories, especially at the basic and subordinate 
level of abstraction.  
 In contrast to the differentiation view, when contrasting two basic level categories 
(e.g., dogs and cats) that originate from the same superordinate level parent (e.g., 
animals), the two categories will share many commonalities (e.g., four legs, heads, tails, 
fur, sharp teeth, claws), but differ by having many alignable differences (such as 
retractable claws versus stationary claws, differing head shape, etc.). Similarly, two 
subordinate level categories (e.g., Golden retrievers and Border collies) that originate 
from the same basic level parent (e.g., dogs) will also share many commonalities (e.g., 
similar head structure, dentition, body shape, fur), but differ based on many alignable 
differences (e.g., fur color/length/texture, muzzle shape, ear shape). In addition, 
subordinate level categories from the same superordinate level parent, but different basic 
level parents also share representational structure with each other. Therefore, in contrast 
to the differentiation view, when two lower level categories share the same higher level 
of abstraction parent, using only the commonalities shared between and within them is 
insufficient to determine category membership; one must use both the commonalities and 
the alignable differences to help determine category membership at the lower levels of 
abstraction (Markman & Wisniewskie, 1997). Both views, however, are of importance 
when considering the developmental trajectory of the levels of abstraction in concept 
formation. 
Order of Emergence – The Developmental Trajectory of Concept Formation 
 Basic level first hypothesis. As mentioned previously, it has been suggested that 
basic level categories are somehow cognitively privileged categories due to the fact that 
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they are the level at which “natural groupings of organisms possess bundles of correlated 
features and which are obviously different from other organisms” (Rosch et al., 1976, p. 
386). In other words, basic level categories balance being highly differentiated from each 
other and highly related within each other. This balance and hypothesized cognitive bias 
has led to the suggestion that basic level categories are the first level of abstraction at 
which infants and children form concepts and continue to be the first accessed concepts 
throughout development (Rosch et al., 1976; Tanaka & Taylor, 1991).  
 For supporters of this view, the basic level emerges first. Superordinate levels are 
then formed by grouping together related basic level categories and subordinate levels by 
differentiating within the basic level categories (Quinn, 2002, 2004a). Rosch and 
colleagues (1976) found that basic level categories remained stable and privileged across 
development, from childhood through adulthood. This finding suggests that once formed, 
basic level categories will not change in their structure/organization, and a bias toward 
accessing category membership at this level remains across development. However, for 
both superordinate and subordinate levels, changes occur across the lifespan. Rosch and 
colleagues (1976) found that there were developmental changes only for superordinate 
level categories. Later research has shown the impact of expertise on the formation of 
subordinate level categories, which suggests that one must gather experience with the 
more broad members of a basic level category before forming a separate, more specific 
subordinate level category (Quinn, 2002, 2004a; Tanaka & Taylor, 1991). 
 Superordinate level first hypothesis. In contrast, more recent research has 
questioned the accuracy of Rosch and colleagues’ (1976) developmental trajectory of 
concept formation Whereas basic level concepts may be relatively privileged once 
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formed, many researchers have found evidence that it is the more global, superordinate 
level concepts that are formed first in development (Lazareva, Soto, & Wasserman, 2010; 
Mareschal & Quinn, 2001; Quinn, 2002, 2004a; Quinn & Tanaka, 2007; Rakison & 
Butterworth, 1998). Though superordinate categories share fewer within category 
similarities, they share many highly discriminable between category differences. For 
instance, the most typical exemplars of the superordinate level category of animals can 
generally be described, with exceptions of course, as all having legs of some form while 
most members of the category of vehicles can be described as having wheels, not legs, of 
some form. Whereas, when comparing two basic level categories (e.g., dogs versus cats), 
one must rely upon closer inspection of “specific values of similar features” (i.e.,head and 
general body shape) to discriminate among members of the different categories (Quinn, 
2002, p. 68).  
 The fact that superordinate level categories possess attributes that are easily 
discriminable from one another and are more frequently encountered than basic level 
attributes has led to the assertion that this level is first to emerge in development. 
Children would be able to make quick category judgments based on the presence or 
absence of highly salient attributes for superordinate groupings in comparison to more 
precise, detail-based judgments for basic level categories. The developmental trajectory 
for subscribers to the global/superordinate level first hypothesis would be that basic level 
categories are abstracted from superordinate level categories, and subordinate level 
categories would be formed by further subdivisions of the basic level categories 
(Mareschal & Quinn, 2001; Quinn, 2002, 2004a; Quinn & Tanaka, 2007). From birth to 
two and a half years old, the predominant level of abstraction utilized when making 
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category distinctions is the superordinate level (for review see Mareschal & Quinn, 
2001). However, what the two aforementioned hypotheses fail to explain is what 
information is utilized by the infants/children to form these concepts, regardless of when 
they emerge in development. 
How Do Very Young Children Form Concepts? 
 The previous sections have focused on theories regarding what types of concepts 
are formed and when the different levels emerge. However, a source of further debate 
focuses on how these concepts are formed by very young children (e.g., Cimpian & 
Erickson, 2012; Quinn, 2002, 2004a, 2004b; Quinn & Eimas, 1996). Is the ability to form 
and utilize concepts innate or learned? In addition, what types of information do very 
young children utilize when forming early concepts?  
 Bottom-up concept formation – Perceptual basis of concepts. Some argue that the 
ability to form and utilize concepts is an innate ability, emerging as soon as the human 
infant is capable of perceiving the structure of their environment (Cimpian & Erickson, 
2012; Mandler, 1992). Such a view suggests that infants and very young children 
(i.e.,early language learners) are forming these concepts online, or while they are actively 
perceiving the environment. Phrased differently, very young children are forming 
concepts from the bottom-up, detecting the inherent structure in the world and using that 
structure to gather the necessary information to form concepts (Cimpian & Erickson, 
2012; Zhang & Schmitt, 1998). The information utilized by this bottom-up formation 
must be readily available to the infants and children.  
 Mandler (1992) suggests that the mechanism by which these early concepts are 
formed is perceptual analysis. Perceptual analysis is a process in which stimuli in the 
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environment that can be readily perceived by the senses (e.g., vision) is analyzed in order 
to extract necessary information from the stimuli. That information is then recoded into 
mental representations of the meaning of the information, which is then used as the basis 
to form accessible concepts. The key to this process of perceptual analysis is that infants 
and very young children are using the perceptual features of the stimulus to form the 
concepts online, as they perceive their environment. That is, infants and very young 
children, who are predisposed to think in terms of concepts, are utilizing the perceptual 
information readily available, such as head shape or face structure, to form complex, 
abstract mental representations about information in their environments. 
 But, for subscribers to this line of reasoning, what types of perceptual information 
are necessary and/or sufficient in order to form these concepts? If it is information that is 
readily perceivable, then the features being utilized must be surface features, such as 
coloration or body shape (Quinn, 2002). However, it has been found that for concepts of 
animals, information from the head region alone is not only sufficient, but seems to be 
necessary in order to form concepts (Quinn & Eimas, 1996). Specific information, such 
as the aforementioned, could then be “anchored by multiple static and dynamic 
attributes” of the objects (Quinn, 2002, p. 68). Perceptual information can be gathered 
after a single exposure to the stimulus, thereby, making perceptual analysis cognitively 
economical in terms of preserving cognitive resources for other tasks (Rakison & 
Butterworth, 1998).  
 The assertion that infants and very young children use readily available perceptual 
features to form concepts from the bottom-up helps to explain the evidence 
demonstrating that they may be predisposed to form more global, superordinate 
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categories. Initially, at least, the presence or absence of obvious perceptual features helps 
to discriminate between more broad, superordinate categories, such as animals from 
nonanimals. For instance, the possession of eyes and self-propelled movement can 
distinguish an animal from a non-animal, such as a tree. These very readily apparent 
attributes are less likely to help discriminate between basic and subordinate level 
category members (Quinn, 2004a; Rakison & Butterworth, 1998). As mentioned 
previously, information of this type can be extracted after a single instance, and therefore, 
does not necessitate repeated exposures to form concepts, which reserves cognitive 
resources for other tasks (Rakison & Butterworth, 1998). 
 Top-down concept formation – Role of prior experience. In contrast to the 
hypothesis that the formation and utilization of concepts is an innate ability, some suggest 
that experience with the world is needed in order to form concepts. Those who support 
this view suggest that conceptual ability is a late-emerging ability. Thus, infants and very 
young children possess not concepts, but percepts, with percepts being perceptually-
driven representations that contain no true conceptual basis. Piaget (1952), for instance, 
believed that until the infant is capable of producing mental representations, an ability he 
believed did not occur until after the first year and a half of life (late sensorimotor-early 
preoperational stage), they were incapable of forming concepts; therefore, any 
“conceptual-like” behaviors were merely percepts with the single function of allowing for 
identification of stimuli in order to react appropriately in its presence (Mandler, 1992). 
The necessity to utilize prior experience and theories created from information previously 
gathered from the environment suggests that concepts, in contrast to percepts, are formed 
22 
 
from the top-down. If present and available, even infants are capable of using prior 
knowledge and experience to guide concept formation (Mareschal & Quinn, 2001).  
 Some evidence for the use of top-down processing in concept formation is the 
relatively late emergence of subordinate level categories. It has been suggested that only 
after an infant gains exposure to a basic level category can they then abstract more 
specific, subordinate level categories (Quinn & Tanaka, 2007; Tanaka & Taylor, 1991). 
These findings help explain the effects of expertise on the basic level bias. Tanaka and 
Taylor (1991) found that experts on specific basic level categories (birds and dogs), 
compared to novices, showed a subordinate level bias by naming more novel attributes 
for specific species (subordinate level categories) of birds or dogs than for the basic level 
categories as a whole. This pattern is in contrast to the results shown by novices in this 
experiment where more novel attributes were named for basic level categories. Rosch and 
colleagues’ (1976) pioneering experiment also found that more novel attributes were 
named for basic level categories than for subordinate level categories. Only after 
experience with the specific category members within a basic or superordinate level 
category do subordinate level categories emerge, demonstrating the use of top-down 
processing to form these concepts (Quinn & Tanaka, 2007). Perceptual features alone are 
not always sufficient to form concepts, suggesting the role of prior experience as one of 
importance, even in early concept formation. 
 In addition, the more abstract categories could also rely heavily upon experience 
for their formation. As categories become more abstract, some suggest that the 
characteristics that define these categories become less readily apparent by perceptual 
analysis, thereby necessitating possession of a more conceptual understanding of 
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category membership. The information utilized to generate this conceptual understanding 
may originate from perceptual analysis, but is not directly derived from perceptual 
features (Vonk & MacDonald, 2002, 2004). The only way to gain this type of conceptual 
understanding is through experience with the environment and learning about the more 
non-obvious attributes that contribute to category formation (Quinn, 2004b). 
 Reconciling top-down versus bottom-up processing. From the existing evidence, it 
seems prudent to suggest that infants and very young children use both perceptual 
features and prior experience to form concepts. What may begin as a primarily 
perceptually driven process may develop into conceptual understanding as an individual 
gains more and more experience with the environment. More readily perceivable 
attributes may be supplemented by information regarding more non-obvious attributes 
(e.g., internal structures) through experience and learning. If prior experience is available 
to be drawn upon, infants will utilize it, but in its absence, perceptual features could 
become more heavily weighted (Mareschal & Quinn, 2001). Existing research suggests 
that perceptual and conceptual categorization follow a parallel developmental trajectory 
and involve comparable, yet separate, cognitive processing mechanisms (Quinn, 2004a).  
 What role then does language - one of the most salient human experiences – play 
in the development of concepts? If concepts, particularly more abstract concepts, are 
formed based on more than perception alone, does experience with one’s native language 
impact how concepts are formed in early language learners? In addition, it is possible that 
the shift from early, perceptually based percepts to more abstract, theory driven concepts 
is facilitated or mediated by the acquisition of language (Gelman & Coley, 1990). The 
next section will delve into the impact of language on natural concept formation. 
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Language’s Impact on Natural Concepts 
 As reviewed, there is a vast amount of literature regarding the impact of language 
on the perception of the environment. Given the unlikelihood that language has no impact 
on cognitive abilities in humans, the question is to what extent does language impact 
cognition, particularly natural concept formation? There are those who argue for a strong 
version of the LRH (i.e.,Linguistic Determinism), suggesting that the structure of one’s 
native language can override perceptual information when forming concepts (Gelman & 
Markman, 1987; Plunkett et al., 2008). However, evidence from work with very young 
infants, children with autism, deaf children, and nonhumans suggests the possibility that 
concept formation is an innate capacity, based in the abstraction of perceptual features, 
that does not explicitly depend on language and could have emerged earlier in our 
phylogenetic history than previously thought (Bhatt et al., 1988; Cimpian & Erickson, 
2012; Fabre-Thorpe, Richard, & Thorpe, 1998; Gasteb, Strauss, & Minshew, 2006; 
Lazareva et al., 2004; Lazareva et al., 2010; Roberts & Mazmanian, 1988; Vonk, Jett, & 
Mosteller, 2012; Vonk, Jett, Mosteller, & Galvan, 2013; Vonk & MacDonald, 2002, 
2004). The following sections will investigate the various hypothesized roles that 
language plays in concept formation. 
 LRH and natural concepts. Does the language one hears and speaks affect the 
types of concepts one forms? The simple answer for supporters of the LRH would be 
“yes”. Labels are proposed to aid in concept formation by providing information about 
the underlying/internal structure and more abstract, implicit characteristics of 
objects/entities that one would not know by perceptual features alone (Gelman & 
Markman, 1987; Hermann, Medin, & Waxman, 2012; Plunkett et al., 2008). In this role, 
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language is acting not as a meddler, but as an augmenter to perception, reducing some of 
the inherent “fuzziness” in natural categories (Bhatt et al., 1988; Wolff & Holmes, 2011). 
For instance, a very young child may confuse a zebra as a horse because of the perceptual 
similarities between the two animals. Providing distinctive labels for the two animals can 
aid the child in categorizing the animals properly and, thereafter, forming an anchored 
concept for zebras that is independent of their concept of horses (Johnson, Mervis, & 
Boster, 1992). Along the same line of reasoning, providing the same label for 
perceptually dissimilar objects, such as calling both a whale and a dog a mammal, point 
out the similarities between the two perceptually distinct species (Plunkett et al., 2008). 
 Clearly then, language is implicated in concept formation even before the infant 
can produce or has fully acquired language. What this suggests is that it is not only the 
language one speaks that can affect conceptual understanding, but the language one hears 
as well. Specifically, the language utilized by the primary caregiver(s) should have a 
major impact on the child’s conceptual abilities. There have been discussions of the role 
that caregivers’ language may play in concept formation, but as of yet, there has been 
very little empirical research to directly test this relationship (Plunkett et al., 2008; 
Tanaka & Taylor, 1991). One exception is the cultural consensus model discussed by 
Johnson and colleagues (1992). The model predicts that some pieces of information are 
more widely distributed throughout a culture and become representative of a cultural 
truth for that society. Truth, in this model, is defined not by factual integrity, but on the 
basis that the majority of the members within that culture believe it to be accurate 
(Johnson et al., 1992). 
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 This model implies that the role of language is in spreading the truth about 
category membership. For instance, taxonomically speaking, humans are categorized as 
members of the ape family, along with chimpanzees, gorillas, orangutans, bonobos, and 
gibbons. However, in some cultures, it might be considered inaccurate to categorize 
humans as animals, let alone as apes. Thereby, for that group, the cultural consensus 
model would suggest that humans are in a separate category from other apes and/or 
animals. This cultural knowledge is passed on through language by older members of the 
society, such as parents and/or primary caregivers. Differences arise between the 
concepts of very young children and adults due to young children’s lack of experience 
and exposure to cultural truths. Also, this model explains differences in conceptual 
understanding between cultures with differing languages (Johnson et al., 1992). 
 The findings just reviewed lend support to the LRH in that language works as an 
augmenter to perception and helps to explain discrepancies between cultures when they 
arise. What remains unanswered, however, is what factors that make up human language 
aide in the process of categorization and concept formation for early language learners? 
Is it semantic knowledge regarding the meanings of words, grammatical competency, or 
more practical aspects of linguistic competence that create this relationship between 
language and concept formation? To date, there have been no studies directly 
investigating the role that language in a more complex, broader sense plays in concept 
formation, but there have been allusions to the role that semantic knowledge might play 
in concept formation (Gelman & Coley, 1990).  
 Gelman and Coley (1990) propose that for members of a category that do not 
possess an overabundance of perceptual commonalities with other category members 
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(i.e., atypical members), semantic knowledge of category names supplement the lack of 
perceptual information in order to accurately form concepts of categories that include 
these atypical members. If given labels for the categories, very young children were 
better able to categorize atypical members due to the fact that the semantic knowledge of 
the meaning of the category label provided the supplemental information necessary for 
accurate categorization and subsequent concept formation (Gelman & Coley, 1990). 
These results provide evidence suggesting that semantic knowledge could be important 
for natural concept formation, but other linguistic components could play a role as well, 
therefore, necessitating direct testing of this question, using a broader definition of 
language before conclusions can be drawn. 
 Concept formation “without” language? Though language may play a significant 
role in concept formation for typically developing humans, there is evidence that 
language is not a necessary, condition for concept formation. It may very well augment 
concept formation, especially when perceptual features fail, but there is evidence to 
suggest that it is not explicitly needed in order to form concepts, even at more abstract 
levels (e.g., Bhatt et al., 1988; Cimpian & Erickson, 2012; Goldin-Meadow, Gelman, & 
Mylander, 2005; Roberts & Mazmanian, 1988). Some of this evidence originates from 
work with children with autism spectrum disorders (ASD) (Gasteb et al., 2006; Soulieres, 
Mottron, Giguere, & Larochelle, 2011), deaf children (Goldin-Meadow et al., 2005; 
Ozcaliskan, Goldin-Meadow, Gentner, & Mylander, 2009), and nonhuman animals 
(Bhatt et al., 1988; Lazareva et al., 2004; Lazareva et al., 2010; Roberts & Mazmanian, 
1988; Vonk et al., 2012;  Vonk et al., 2013; Vonk & MacDonald, 2002, 2004).  
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 Cimpian and Erickson (2012) suggest that the capacity to think in categories is an 
innate ability for humans. From birth, human infants are predisposed to think in “kinds” – 
things in the world “go together” due to some inherent structure in nature. These authors 
suggest that this ability to group things into categories is not explicitly dependent upon 
linguistic input. In addition, the augmenting role of language can exist only if the child is 
already working under the assumption that objects/entities can be banded together to 
form categories. By this assertion, the authors are suggesting that it is not language that 
augments concept formation, but concepts that aide in the understanding of language 
(Cimpian & Erickson, 2012).  
 Even those who support the idea that language augments perception and concept 
formation concede that without specific linguistic input, perceptual features play a major 
role in concept formation in infants and very young children (Gelman & Coley, 1990; 
Johnson et al., 1992; Plunkett et al., 2008). For instance, Johnson and colleagues (1992) 
discuss the ethnobiological, or cross-cultural universal, model as the contrasting model 
to the cultural consensus model. The cross-cultural universal model predicts that the 
ways in which various people perceive the regularities in the natural world is similar 
across cultures and language barriers, resulting in universal trends in categorizing natural 
entities. These universals emerge due to the fact that humans exist in the same world and 
share many of the same perceptual experiences, despite being a part of differing cultures 
and speaking different languages. 
 The cross-cultural universal model bases its prediction regarding universals on the 
fact that we categorize entities based on morphological, highly salient, perceptual 
features, not specifics based on the structures of various languages. While Johnson and 
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colleagues (1992) found support for the cultural consensus model in their experiments, 
they admit the undeniable importance of perceptual features in concept formation when 
linguistic cues are not present (Johnson et al., 1992). Similarly, Gelman and Coley (1990) 
state that children can and do use perceptual information to determine category 
membership in the absence of language, even when the perceptual features are 
misleading or confusing, therefore, leaving open the possibility of concept formation 
without language. 
 Children with Autism Spectrum Disorders. However, for typically developing 
human children, it is nearly impossible to extricate the potential impact of language on 
concept formation because they are immersed in it from birth. There are human 
populations, though, that lend themselves to studying concept formation without 
language. One such population is lower functioning children with ASD, due largely to the 
fact that ASD is characterized by social, behavioral, and linguistic deficits/abnormalities 
as compared to typically developing children (subsequently referred to as typicals). 
Relevant to their abilities to form concepts is the suggestion that children with ASD may 
show significant differences in cognitive processing and executive functioning as 
compared to typicals. For instance, they may show general problems with data reduction 
from infancy, but a heightened sensitivity to detail and feature detection, which, when 
coupled together, makes grouping things together into categories, and hence forming 
concepts, more difficult (Gasteb et al., 2006; Soulieres et al., 2011). In addition, lower 
functioning children’s more severe language deficits could prevent them from using 
labels as cues to supplement perceptual features (Gasteb et al., 2006). 
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 Despite the differences found between typicals and children with ASD regarding 
executive functioning and language, children with ASD do form concepts for natural 
objects in their environments. Even with linguistic deficits, children with ASD group 
objects together into categories and form mental representations for those categories. Are 
those concepts the same as those formed by typicals? The answer to that question, at this 
point, is “maybe.” Gasteb and colleagues (2006) have demonstrated that children with 
ASD do, indeed, form concepts despite their language deficits, though at a slower pace 
than typicals (Gasteb et al., 2006). In explanation of Gasteb and colleagues’ (2006) 
findings, Soulieres and colleagues (2011) suggest that this slower categorization seen in 
children with ASD may be due - not to deficits in categorization ability- but to 
differences in the strategies they use to form concepts. They found that children with 
ASD tended to need longer exposure to the exemplars before their categorization began 
to resemble that of typicals. Typicals began to extract rules for categorizing the 
exemplars quickly; for example, all entities with oval head shapes, spotted back patterns, 
and yellow coloration go together, despite having different tails and body shapes.  
 Children with ASD, however, required significantly more exposure to the 
exemplars before any strategy seemed to emerge that resembled the rule-based strategies 
of the typicals. The authors suggest that for children with ASD, using this experience-
based, rule-based, top-down strategy may take time and initially play a lesser role to 
simply guessing. Again, however, the children with ASD were forming concepts, despite 
their linguistic deficits, albeit more slowly and using different strategies than typicals 
(Soulieres et al., 2011). These findings allude to the possibility that language may play a 
lesser role in concept formation relative to other cognitive skills, such as executive 
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functioning and relational skills. While language may act as an augmenter to concept 
formation when present and intact, it is not a necessary tool in that process. 
 Children born deaf with no linguistic input. Children born deaf can also shed light 
on the role of language in concept formation. Whereas many deaf children grow up in 
environments where linguistic input is present in the form of American Sign Language 
(or the prevailing gestural system of their culture) from very early on in their lives, there 
are others who are not exposed to language in any meaningful form throughout their 
development. This population is perhaps the best analog for studying concept formation 
without language outside of utilizing nonhumans. Deaf children create gestures to 
communicate information about generic, global kinds, such as birds fly, which emphasize 
stable, enduring characteristics of category members that are readily perceived by the 
senses. Even without linguistic input, these children are able to form concepts for 
entities/objects in their environments in order to create a way in which to communicate 
this information, emphasizing the role of perceptual features for concept formation 
(Goldin-Meadow et al., 2005; Ozcaliskan et al., 2009). This finding also lends support to 
the notion that concepts actually help structure language instead of the reverse (Cimpian 
& Erickson, 2012). 
 Nonhuman animals. In order to study the effects of no linguistic input on the 
ability to form concepts, nonhuman animals are frequently utilized as models. 
Comparative work has been done to determine what types of concepts animals are able to 
form in the absence of human-like language. Premack (1983) asserted that only language-
trained apes and humans were capable of using more than perceptual similarity to form 
concepts of more abstract categories that do not rely on concrete, image based 
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representations. This proposition suggests that non-language trained animals should have 
relatively little difficulty forming concrete, subordinate level concepts (e.g., members of 
the same species), but more difficulty as the concepts increase in abstraction to basic and 
superordinate level concepts. However, research has shown that animals of varying 
species can form concepts at more than the concrete level, some at multiple levels at 
once, suggesting that this ability to utilize more abstract concepts is not specifically 
dependent upon language (Bhatt et al., 1988; Fabre-Thorpe et al., 1998; Lazareva et al., 
2004; Roberts & Mazmanian, 1988; Vonk et al., 2012; 2013; Vonk & MacDonald, 2002, 
2004). 
 Some of the seminal work on concept formation at varying levels of abstraction in 
animals was done with pigeons. Bhatt and colleagues (1988) found that despite the fuzzy 
boundaries of natural categories, pigeons were capable of forming basic level concepts 
(specifically - cats, people, flowers, cars, and chairs). These categories, however, were 
perceptually dissimilar between categories and similar within categories, thereby, 
possibly making the formation of the concepts easier. Lazareva and colleagues (2004, 
2010) extracted two global, abstract level categories from the basic level categories used 
by Bhatt et al. (1988) to test pigeons’ abilities to form more abstract concepts. The two 
superordinate level categories they formed were natural (flowers plus people) and 
artificial (cars plus chairs). They found that pigeons could not only form basic level 
concepts, but they were also capable of forming more superordinate level concepts that 
rely less on perceptual similarity and more on deeper, conceptual knowledge about the 
members. These findings also demonstrate that pigeons, like humans, can simultaneously 
and flexibly categorize the same stimuli at multiple levels of abstraction, though it is 
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possible that they simply learned to treat the two categories (e.g., flowers and people) 
similarly while lacking an overarching category that encapsulates them (Lazareva et al., 
2004; Lazareva et al., 2010). Taken together, the work with pigeons indicates that 
concept formation is not exclusively dependent upon language and emerged farther back 
in evolutionary history than previously believed. 
 Nonhuman primates have also been widely researched due to their close genetic 
relationship to humans and the benefit to understanding the phylogenetic roots of concept 
formation. Roberts and Mazmanian (1988) tested whether or not squirrel monkeys, 
humans, and pigeons could form concepts at varying levels of abstraction. At the most 
concrete level, which corresponds to the subordinate level of abstraction, the animals 
were tested for their ability to form concepts for one species of bird (kingfishers) that 
excluded other species of birds. If the animals were able to form concepts at only this 
level, Premack’s (1983) hypothesis would be supported in that they are not capable of 
abstract conceptual understanding. The intermediate level, which corresponds to the basic 
level, discrimination required the animals to form a concept of birds that excluded other 
animals. At the most abstract level, which corresponds to the superordinate level, the 
animals were tested for their ability to form a concept for animals that excluded 
nonanimals (Roberts & Mazmanian, 1988).  
 Pigeons were found to learn concepts at the concrete level discrimination more 
rapidly as compared to the other levels, which supported Premack’s (1983) hypothesis. 
However, the monkeys were able to form concepts at both the concrete and abstract level 
of abstraction, with the slowest acquisition to the intermediate level in both nonhuman 
animal species (Roberts & Mazmanian, 1988). Similar results have been found in non-
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language trained rhesus macaques (Fabre-Thorpe et al., 1998) and a juvenile gorilla 
(Vonk & MacDonald, 2002). More recent work with orangutans (Vonk & MacDonald, 
2004) and chimpanzees (Vonk et al., 2013) have also shown similar patterns of results, 
demonstrating that the basic level is salient in their conceptual understanding. Outside of 
the primate order, recent work by Vonk and colleagues (2012) has demonstrated that 
American black bears are capable of forming concepts at varying levels of abstraction. 
While these animals’ concept formation capabilities may differ in the way in which they 
are formed or the amount of exposure needed to form concepts, they, like non-typically 
developing children, form concepts at multiple levels of abstraction. The aforementioned 
results from children with ASD, children who were born deaf and were not exposed to 
ASL, pigeons, nonhuman primates, and black bears demonstrate that these populations 
are capable of abstract thought and concept formation, despite their linguistic deficits 
and/or lack of linguistic input. 
Summary of Natural Concepts 
 Forming concepts for naturally occurring stimuli is a daunting task due to the 
inherently ill-defined structure of natural categories (Bhatt et al., 1988) where features 
overlap between categories, some members are atypical members of the category that do 
not share many features with other members, etc. This task has been suggested to be 
impacted by the language one speaks and hears. Language may act as an augmenter, 
highlighting commonalities and regularities in the environment that might not be readily 
perceivable by the senses (e.g., Plunkett et al., 2008). Findings showing conceptual 
abilities in populations that lack linguistic input (e.g., children with ASD, deaf children, 
and nonhuman animals) demonstrate, however, that language is not a necessary 
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component to concept formation (e.g., Gasteb et al., 2006; Goldin-Meadow et al., 2005; 
Roberts & Mazmanian, 1988).  
 When present, though, language does appear to play a role in shaping concepts. 
Being that language is more than simply knowing the labels for objects and entities in the 
environment, is there more to the relationship between language and concept formation 
than what traditional measures of language ability provide? Another relevant question is 
what role does language play in forming concepts that are based on psychological, in 
contrast to biological, categories? Particularly, what role does language play in the 
formation of concepts for human emotions?  
Emotion Recognition 
 Humans are by nature social animals; social living brings about challenges that 
are unique to living in groups. Some of those challenges include interacting with 
conspecifics, forming and maintaining social bonds, maintaining social order, escaping 
danger, confronting threats, and dealing with losses (Abe & Izard, 1999). Overcoming 
those challenges is done partially through the ability to interpret the emotions of 
conspecifics and reacting accordingly. But, how does one “read” the internal state of 
another? Some suggest that we have developed an outward, emotion signaling system 
using facial expressions that allows for quick interpretation of the emotion of a 
conspecific without the influence of language (Abe & Izard, 1999; Ekman, 1969, 1970; 
Ekman & Friesen, 1971; Izard, 1994). Whereas, others suggest that the language we 
speak determines/shapes the way in which we interpret facial expressions, essentially 
stating that language creates the emotional reality in which we live (Lindquist et al., 
2006; Russell & Bullock, 1985). 
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Emotion Recognition “Without” Language – Role of Facial Expressions 
 When a layperson is approached regarding how they know how someone is 
feeling (i.e.,interpreting the internal, emotional state of a conspecific), perhaps the most 
popular response is that they use facial expressions to determine which emotion the 
person is feeling from moment to moment. This commonly held belief that facial 
expressions are a reliable means by which to judge the internal state of another human 
was not widely accepted in the scientific community prior to the 1960s. Researchers, at 
the time, believed that the face was actually a meager source of relevant information for 
emotion recognition, and what information was provided was inaccurate and specific to 
the culture in which one lived. These beliefs directly contradicted long-held folk beliefs 
and evidence of the salience of faces to humans even in early infancy (Carroll & Russell, 
1996; Ekman, 1993). 
 Following the hypotheses originally proposed by Darwin, two researchers, Paul 
Ekman and Carroll Izard, separately pioneered the empirical study of the cultural 
universality and innateness of facial expressions by comparing facial expressions and the 
interpretation thereof between and among cultures around the world. What these 
researchers and their colleagues found was that there was tremendous overlap in the types 
of facial expressions produced and the interpretations of these expressions among the 
cultures studied (e.g., Ekman, 1969, 1970; Ekman & Friesen, 1971; Izard, 1994). Their 
findings led to the proposal of an emotion signaling system and the innateness-
universality hypothesis (IUH), both of which are underpinned by the assertion that facial 
expressions provide rich information that one can utilize in social situations to interpret 
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the emotional state of a conspecific and react accordingly (Ekman, 1993; Izard, 1994; 
Widen & Russell, 2010). 
 Emotion signaling system. The theory of an emotion signaling system predicts that 
certain patterns of facial movements, or facial expressions, have been selected for in our 
species’ evolution as outward, visible signals for specific emotions. This association 
between facial expressions and emotions is not arbitrary, but selected for through natural 
selection (Ekman, 1999; Widen & Russell, 2010). Having unique facial expressions as 
signals for emotions suggests that there are discrete psychological states occurring in an 
individual and that both the individual experiencing the emotion and those observing the 
individual possess a set of mental categories/concepts by which they can readily interpret 
each of those discrete states using the signals provided (Abe & Izard, 1999). The emotion 
signaling system is hypothesized to be in place and fully functioning before one year of 
age (innate) and biologically-based, suggesting that there is a unique evolutionary 
advantage for survival in group settings for producing easily interpretable, distinctive 
facial expressions for specific emotions (Izard, 1994; Widen & Russell, 2010).  
 According to this view, expressions serve as “a functional communication system 
that preceded language in evolution and precedes language in ontogeny” (Izard, 1994, p. 
290). It is inherently adaptive and necessary to life in a social group to have differential, 
universally recognized emotion signals. These signals should be representative of specific 
emotions and not just based on valence (i.e., positive or negative). For instance, consider 
an adult playing outdoors with a toddler. In one situation, the adult comes across a dead 
animal in the grass by their feet and reacts with an expression of sadness or disgust. In 
another situation, the adult comes across a poisonous snake in the grass near his foot and 
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reacts with an expression of fear. If the emotion signaling system was not innate and was 
based only on valence, the toddler would not gain much information from the 
expressions. Conversely, if toddlers had an innate capacity to interpret each expression as 
representing a distinct emotion, they could gain much more information that is vital to 
their survival (Izard, 1994). An inability to recognize and discriminate between signals 
provided by conspecifics is a significant disadvantage to survival in social groups (Widen 
& Russell, 2010).    
 The innateness-universality hypothesis (IUH). The IUH arose out of the evidence 
for the emotion signaling system. As is stated in its name, the IUH predicts that emotion 
recognition based on facial expressions is both innate and universal. There are six “basic” 
emotions that have been identified: anger, fear, sadness, happiness, surprise, and disgust. 
These “basic” emotions have gained the most support for being innate and universally 
expressed by specific facial configurations (Ekman, 1993; Waller et al., 2008). From 
birth, human infants show a particular interest in and preferentially attend to the face. 
Throughout development, faces have been shown to provide substantial information that 
helps to organize and bring coherence to perceptual information (Quinn & Eimas, 1996). 
Infants as young as three months old have been shown to be able to discriminate positive 
from negative facial expressions, and by four to six months, have demonstrated the 
ability to distinguish between at least some of the basic emotions (fear, anger, and 
surprise).  
 By six to seven months, infants have been shown to be able to discriminate 
among all the negative (fear, sadness, anger, and disgust) emotions based on facial 
expressions (Izard, 1994). By the end of the first year of life, infants are able to use their 
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experience with facial expressions to direct their behaviors when interacting with a social 
partner through the use of social referencing (Widen & Russell, 2010). Early and 
relatively sophisticated understanding of the basic emotions is proposed to be solely 
based on biological cues, the most impactful of which are facial expressions (Wellman, 
Harris, Banerjee, & Sinclair, 1995), creating what is known as the Face Superiority Effect 
- more accurate categorization of emotions depicted when facial expressions are available 
(Russell & Widen, 2002). This evidence provides support for the innateness of the use 
and interpretation of facial expressions in emotion recognition. In addition, this early 
ability to utilize and interpret emotion information facilitates infant-caregiver attachment, 
social referencing, and the development of empathy and theory of mind (Russell & 
Widen, 2002).  
 As for the universality component of the IUH, evidence of the presence and utility 
of expressions for the basic emotions has been demonstrated in both literate and pre-
literate cultures around the world. This evidence suggests that these expressions are 
culturally universal in nature, regardless of the language spoken in the cultures (e.g., 
Ekman, 1969, 1970, 1999). Across twenty-one literate cultures, there was strong 
agreement about the emotions portrayed by specific posed facial expressions. Members 
of pre-literate cultures chose the same facial expression to match an emotion-eliciting 
story that was chosen by members of literate cultures. Also, when judging and producing 
spontaneous facial expressions, there were no major differences between the cultures 
studied (Ekman, 1999).  
 However, some minor differences between and among cultures were found. 
According to the differential emotions theory, each distinct basic emotion varies along 
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dimensions of intensity, from understated to extremely intense, causing slight variations 
in facial expressions, but still containing similar underlying morphological features (e.g., 
smiles for happiness and frowns for sadness) (Abe & Izard, 1999; Izard, 1994). 
Differences in the expression of certain emotions in some cultures arise from variations 
in what have been termed as “display rules.” Display rules are culturally-specific rules 
regarding who and to whom one can show certain emotions and when it is 
proper/appropriate to display certain emotions. The differences between cultures that 
have been found emanate from these display rules and not from differences in the ability 
to produce the facial expressions or interpret the messages given by these signals across 
cultures (Ekman, 1993, 1999). 
 Taken together, the aforementioned information provides a solid argument for the 
existence of an emotion signaling system and support for the IUH. These findings suggest 
that emotion recognition is not dependent upon language and is possible in the total 
absence of language. This argument is supported by evidence demonstrating similar 
facial configurations between humans and other primate species, including apes and Old 
and New World monkeys (Ekman, 1999). However, there are those who assert that 
without language as a guide, wading through something as murky as emotion recognition 
in humans is nearly impossible (e.g., Lindquist et al., 2006). The controversy regarding 
the amount of information that can be gained from using nonverbal signaling systems to 
judge emotional states in others is partially due to the fact that some primates, including 
humans, have evolved the capacity to voluntarily control the facial expressions they 
produce in any given situation. This voluntary control allows for the extraction of 
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misleading information from the facial expressions or outright deception on the part of 
the expresser (Izard, 1994).  
 Russell (as cited in Izard, 1994) stated that there were two main issues raised by 
this capability that caused issues for the existence of the emotion signaling system, and 
therefore, the IUH, and its tenants regarding the use of facial information to judge 
emotions in others: 1) is there enough regularity in the link between a facial expression 
and its underlying emotional state to categorize the expression as representing that 
underlying state and 2) can the link between feelings and expressions be modified by the 
voluntary control of facial expression to the extent to which the link becomes 
nonexistent? Izard’s (1994) response to these questions is related to the fact that it would 
be maladaptive to possess such a large communication system of very obvious, self-
revealing signals without the capacity to voluntarily control them when necessary. For 
example, when confronted with an enemy who both outnumbers and has more weaponry 
than you, it would be maladaptive to respond with an expression of fear. It would be 
more adaptive to be able to mislead or deceive one’s enemy by displaying confidence or 
enjoyment, despite your true internal state. This ability to self-regulate facial expressions 
may be a recent adaptation in the phylogeny of the species, not evidence against the 
system or the IUH, and might be a result of the highly complex social lives of humans 
and some other modern primates (Izard, 1994).  
 Despite the evidence provided above, however, there are still many critics who 
challenge the IUH and the reliance upon facial expressions (and other nonverbal signals) 
to classify emotions. The IUH suggests that by emotion recognition being an innate 
capacity, acquisition of the underlying emotion concepts is fast and not drastically altered 
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by the development of other cognitive skills, such as language, due to the fact that the 
basic concepts are already in place at birth. In fact, the absence of a label for an emotion 
does not inherently indicate that a child or culture does not express/feel that emotion. 
Because each basic emotion varies in intensity there are a vast amount of possible terms 
that could be used to describe each variation, so the lack of a term for a specific intensity 
of an emotion does not mean that it is not felt or expressed by a facial expression, just 
that there is no word for it in that culture (Ekman, 1999; Izard, 1994). As a note, there is 
even some evidence of early, relatively sophisticated emotion term comprehension and 
use by very young children that lends credence to the innateness of emotion recognition. 
Ridgeway, Waters, and Kuczaj II (1985) found that infants/toddlers were reliably using 
many of the basic emotion terms before the age of two years. This finding has been 
supported by evidence suggesting that by the age of two, children are referring to a wide 
range of emotions that are expressed by both others and themselves (Dunn, Bretherton, & 
Munn, 1987).  
 However, there are those who argue that the conceptual system that is in place at 
birth, if it exists, is inherently not the same as the conceptual system possessed by adults 
(Widen & Russell, 2008). This gradual emergence of emotion concepts argument has 
gained popularity among supporters of the LRH (e.g., Lindquist et al., 2006) and suggests 
that experience with the emotion labels in one’s language shapes, and possibly, 
effectively determines the ways in which we, particularly infants and early language 
learners, view the affective world (Lindquist et al., 2006; Widen & Russell, 2003, 2008, 
2010). 
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Emotion Recognition “With” Language – LRH and the Circumplex Model 
 Advocates of the LRH suggest that the influence of language extends beyond 
concepts for observable, perceptual categories to help in the formation of concepts for 
unobservable phenomena (e.g., emotional states) (Astington & Jenkins, 1999; Lindquist 
et al., 2006; Wolff & Holmes, 2011). Because emotions are internal, psychological states, 
language allows for clarification when misinterpretations of outward cues occur and for 
reflection on past and/or future events in order to behave appropriately in the present 
(Dunn et al., 1987). As was its role in natural concept formation, language may act as an 
augmenter, providing the extra conceptual tools necessary to form concepts for internal, 
unobservable states (Wolff & Holmes, 2011). 
 Language has been suggested to play a role in differentiating between the varying 
emotions above and beyond what facial expressions are capable of alone. According to 
Carroll and Russell (1996), facial expressions show “limited situational dominance,” 
indicating that expressions are merely “quasi-physical” information that “indicate its 
simplest literal meaning,” (like a smile, cry, or yawn) which by themselves do not 
provide adequate information to judge the underlying psychological state (p. 206). It is 
then up to the language spoken by the culture to determine what emotional state(s) those 
facial expressions represent; in essence language creates the affective reality in which one 
exists (Lindquist et al., 2006). Therefore, it would follow that very young children and 
preverbal infants may not possess the same conceptual representations for emotions, as 
adults who have had more exposure to their native language. The LRH supports a more 
gradual emergence and development of emotion concepts than does the IUH. This 
assertion that emotion concepts are developed in incremental steps and continue to 
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differentiate longer into development than previously believed spurred Russell and 
colleagues to develop a model for how emotion concepts change through development 
and eventually become like those seen in adults. This model is termed the Circumplex 
Model of Emotions (Russell & Bullock, 1985).   
 Circumplex model of emotions. The fundamental premise of the Circumplex 
model is that emotion categories based on different facial expressions fall into two 
bipolar dimensions based on valence (pleasure-displeasure) and vary in degree of arousal. 
Figure 1 shows the graphical representation of the Circumplex model from Russell and 
Bullock (1985, p. 1291). The model gets its name based on the circular pattern that 
emerges when each expression is positioned in the model based on where it falls along 
the dimensions of valence and arousal. 
                                      
Figure 1. Circumplex model of emotions as depicted in Figure 1 from Russell and 
Bullock (1985, p. 1291). 
   
 The main prediction that is derived from the Circumplex model is that the 
emotion concepts possessed by infants and very young children are fundamentally 
different from those of adults. The model predicts that emotion concepts emerge 
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gradually and continue to be shaped as the child develops. Research on the model has 
demonstrated that the emotion categories used by very young children are broader than 
those of adults. Concepts for emotions are initially based on the dimensions of pleasure 
and displeasure (positive-negative) and are differentiated gradually through learning the 
various labels for each specific emotion (Carroll & Russell, 1996; Russell & Bullock, 
1985; Russell & Widen, 2002; Widen & Russell, 2003, 2008, 2010). It is of importance 
to note that this research has focused on the six basic emotions with happiness and 
surprise making up the positive facial expressions/emotions and anger, sadness, fear, and 
disgust constituting the negative facial expressions/emotions. Children do not actually 
possess the conceptual underpinnings to differentiate between the emotions until they 
have acquired the label for the specific emotion (Widen & Russell, 2010). 
 These results suggest that language is an integral part of differentiating the 
various emotions. In fact, Russell and Widen (2002) demonstrated a Label Superiority 
Effect (in contrast to the Face Superiority Effect discussed previously) in very young 
children when categorizing basic emotions. When given the labels for specific emotions, 
the children were significantly more accurate in categorizing facial expressions than 
when given only facial expressions by which to match the images. In the condition where 
facial expressions only were provided to help categorize emotions, children’s 
categorization of the facial expressions fell in line with the dimensions of pleasure-
displeasure. In this experiment, the labels are working in a similar manner as labels for 
natural objects by differentiating between entities that are in the same category and, 
therefore, share more perceptual similarity (Russell & Widen, 2002). For example, Figure 
2 (from Russell & Widen, 2002, p. 38) graphically depicts the pattern of differentiation 
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with age in the children’s concept for the negative emotions (anger, fear, sadness, and 
disgust). 
                                 
Figure 2. Proportion of each type of facial expression categorized as angry by age in 
years from Russell and Widen (2002, Figure 3, p. 38). 
 
 As shown, at two-years-old, the negative emotions (anger, fear, sadness, and 
disgust) are not yet differentiated from each other, with the majority of children 
categorizing all negative facial expressions as anger. By four, sadness begins to become 
differentiated from fear, but full differentiation of the concepts does not occur until later 
in childhood (around seven) and continues even during that time, especially for fear and 
disgust (Russell & Widen, 2002). Russell and his colleagues found that these concepts 
narrow in a very similar manner that follows the acquisition and production of specific 
emotion labels. As the child learns the emotion labels of their native language, the 
concepts they form for specific emotions (based on facial expressions) become narrower 
until they begin to resemble the concepts of adults. They referred to this as a 
differentiation model of emotions based on the Circumplex model (Russell & Widen, 
2002; Widen & Russell, 2008, 2010). 
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 Circumplex model as a differentiation model. Children’s concepts for emotions 
begin in two very broad categories (positive and negative), encompassing all emotions in 
those two categories and not differentiating between the specific emotions as adults do. 
For instance, all negative facial expressions (anger, sadness, fear, and disgust) are 
categorized together; therefore, these categorization “errors” made by very young 
children simply reflect that the concepts they possess are not yet differentiated as are 
those of adults. Differentiation within the broad categories occurs as labels for emotions 
are learned (Widen & Russell, 2010). Tests of the Circumplex model have shown that the 
number of different emotion labels used to label facial expressions increases with age and 
that some expressions are labeled earlier than others (Russell & Widen, 2002; Widen & 
Russell, 2003, 2008). 
 Russell and Widen (2002) and Widen and Russell (2003) demonstrated that the 
labels for each emotion emerge in a systematic manner. If the child produces one emotion 
label, it is happy. If the child produces two emotion labels, they tend to be happy and 
angry (and in some cases, happy and sad). If the child utilizes three labels, they are 
usually happy, sad, and angry. The fourth and fifth labels used are typically either scared 
(fear) or surprise. The final of the basic emotion labels to emerge is disgust. Figure 3 
shows the pattern of emergence of emotion labels by age that has been supported by 
Russell and colleagues (e.g., Russell, & Widen, 2002; Widen & Russell, 2003). 
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Figure 3. A graph depicting the systematic emergence of emotion terms by age (Widen & 
Russell, 2008, Figure 2, p.294). 
 
 The main crux of these findings is that when children perceive facial expressions, 
they interpret them in a different manner than do adults based on the differing conceptual 
structures they possess for emotion concepts. Their “errors’ in categorization are rooted 
in the dimensions of pleasure and displeasure upon which their concepts are based. As it 
is for natural concepts, it is much harder to differentiate between facial expressions 
depicting expressions from the same broad category (e.g., anger and fear). Until the child 
has ample experience with the labels for each emotion and the contexts during which they 
occur, the concepts they form will remain broad and undifferentiated (Russell & Widen, 
2002; Widen & Russell, 2003, 2008, 2010). 
 Language complexity and emotion recognition. The question still remains whether 
the effects of language on emotion concept formation are as simple as learning specific 
labels for specific emotions. Does possession of this extra conceptual tool aid in the 
ability to form specific concepts for each discrete emotion based on the outward cues 
provided by facial expressions? Or, is there is more to language’s role in guiding emotion 
recognition based on facial expressions? There is a significant amount of literature that 
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deals with the relationship between language and the development of social concepts 
such as emotional understanding and theory of mind (Astington & Jenkins, 1999; 
Cheung, 2010; de Rosnay et al., 2004; Watson et al., 2000). A consistent positive 
relationship between the child’s linguistic ability and performance on tasks relating to 
these abilities suggests that the LRH proponents are correct in their belief that language is 
related to how people perceive and interact with the world around them.  
 But what aspects of language are related to these effects? Is it knowledge of the 
meanings of words (semantics) and sheer size of the child’s vocabulary that lead to the 
results shown, or is it grammatical competency and the types of words used/how words 
are used that aides in the formation of social/emotion concepts? There is some evidence 
that both syntactic ability (knowledge of the grammatical rules of language) and 
semantics play a role in false belief understanding (Cheung, 2010). However, there is no 
evidence at this point looking at the complexity of language and how it relates to emotion 
recognition based on facial expressions. The research of Russell and colleagues seems to 
indirectly indicate that semantic knowledge of word meanings is of importance in 
developing emotion concepts for facial expressions (Russell & Widen, 2002; Widen & 
Russell, 2003, 2008, 2010). More research is needed to help fill in the gaps in our 
understanding of language’s role in emotion recognition based on facial expressions and 
to help elucidate the relationship between innate capacity and experience with language. 
The Current Project 
Specific Goals 
 The specific goal of the current project was to elucidate the relationship between 
language complexity and natural and emotion concept formation in early language 
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learners (two-, three-, four-, and five-year-olds). Language complexity provides a 
broader, more encompassing means of assessing language competency by measuring 
more than the child’s semantic (word meanings) competency, which is the major focus of 
most of the traditional language measures. Specifically, the test utilized (a selection of 
assessments taken from the Brigance Diagnostic Inventory of Early Childhood 
Development II henceforth referred to as the IED-II – Brigance, 2004) measured not only 
receptive and expressive vocabulary, but also quantitative term comprehension, select 
aspects of grammatical competency, and more practical/applied linguistic competency. 
The inclusion of these components allows for a better understanding of the role of 
language in concept formation.  
 The IED-II was designed as a broad-spectrum developmental inventory for 
children from birth to age six years. It is highly utilized in educational settings as it is 
criterion-referenced, does not require specialized training to administer, and allows for a 
comprehensive understanding of whether or not the child is developing in a manner that 
is typical for his or her age (Brigance, 2004). The 2004 edition was also norm-referenced 
and validated to be used as a standardized measure (Glascoe, 2004). The IED-II contains 
eleven sections: a) perambulatory motor skills and behaviors, b) gross-motor skills and 
behaviors, c) fine-motor skills and behaviors, d) self-help skills, e) speech and language 
skills, f) general knowledge and comprehension, g) social and emotional development, h) 
readiness, i) basic reading skills, j) manuscript writing, and k) basic math (Brigance, 
2004). The basic productive and receptive vocabulary tasks for this study were taken 
from the Speech and Language Skills, and all other tasks were taken from the General 
Knowledge and Comprehension section.  
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 For the purpose of this study, the language complexity was comprised of the 
child’s composite productive and receptive vocabulary scores in addition to their 
comprehension of quantitative terms. In addition, measures of grammatical competency 
were included and were the child’s knowledge and use of plurals (-s and –ing), 
prepositions, and irregular plural nouns. In order to measure the child’s more 
practical/applied linguistic competency, their knowledge of class inclusions (e.g., foods, 
things you can read, toys), what to do in a given situation, and practical uses of objects 
were assessed (Brigance, 2004).   
 The categories utilized in the natural concept discrimination tasks were based on 
the levels of abstraction described by Rosch and colleagues (1976; subordinate, basic, 
and superordinate). These tasks have been utilized in comparative work with 
chimpanzees and bears by Vonk and colleagues (2012, 2013) and were adapted from the 
tasks utilized by Roberts and Mazmanian (1988) in pigeon, squirrel monkeys, and adult 
humans. They consisted of two-alternative-forced choice (2AFC) tasks, with two images 
representing two different concepts at the same level of abstraction (e.g., basic) presented 
simultaneously on a computer touch-screen. The participant was required to choose one 
of the two images that represent the category member that was correct for that session.  
 These natural concept tasks used images from the following categories, which 
increased in inclusiveness as the levels increase: tigers versus lions (subordinate), cats 
versus dogs (basic), and animals versus nonanimals (superordinate). These particular 
categories were chosen for two reasons. First, early language learners are likely to have 
more experience with, and greater interest in animals; therefore, these stimuli are likely to 
be salient for even the youngest of participants. Secondly, I chose to maintain a concept 
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structure as described by Markman and Wisniewskie (1997), where all lower level 
categories originate from the same parent superordinate level category, which increased 
the between category similarity, but allowed for enough variability to allow for choosing 
categories that have very salient perceptual differences (e.g., tigers have stripes and lions 
do not) at the lower levels.  
 The manipulation of levels of abstraction helped clarify the effects of language at 
the varying levels. At the subordinate level in the current tasks, linguistic cues may not be 
as necessary even for the youngest of participants due to the salient perceptual 
differences. In contrast, there may be a more pronounced need for language at the 
superordinate level in order to highlight the commonalities among the wider ranges of 
members within the categories. In addition, it is of importance to note that each of the 
higher levels incorporated images of members seen in the lower levels. For instance, the 
“cat” category contained both lion and tiger images, therefore, requiring the child to 
make the conceptual connection between the animals that they could have previously had 
to discriminate between in order to perform the lower level task. 
 The task for discriminating emotion concepts was the same as that used for the 
natural concepts. However, instead of images of animals, images of facial expressions 
were used. Five emotion/non-emotions, which included four of the six basic emotions 
discussed previously (anger, sadness, happiness, and positive surprise plus neutral faces), 
were used. In order to make the tasks as analogous as possible, the emotion concepts 
were presented within three levels of abstraction as well. These levels were primarily 
based on Russell and Bullock’s (1985) Circumplex model. As before, the lower levels 
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originated from the same parent superordinate level category and increase in 
inclusiveness as the levels increase.  
 The three levels of abstraction were as follows: anger versus sadness 
(subordinate), positive versus negative (basic), and emotion versus non-emotion 
(superordinate). The basic level categories were chosen based on the findings that very 
young children initially partition emotion concepts based on facial expressions into these 
two broad, more inclusive categories until they are later differentiated as the child learns 
specific labels for each discrete emotion/facial expression (Carroll & Russell, 1996; 
Russell & Widen, 2002; Widen & Russell, 2010). The positive category included facial 
expressions for happiness and positive surprise, while the negative category included 
facial expressions for anger and sadness. These emotions are considered basic emotions 
that have distinct facial expressions (for review, see Ekman, 1994; Keltner & Ekman, 
2000).  
 The superordinate level of the emotion categories, emotion versus non-emotion, 
was the most inclusive of the categories. Both positive and negative emotions were 
combined to create the emotion category, while neutral faces comprised the non-emotion 
category. This study is the first to permit analysis of emotion concepts at varying levels 
of abstraction. The structure of these categories allowed for more direct testing of the 
Circumplex model by testing its central premise of the initial breadth of emotion 
categories in early language learners (Russell & Bullock, 1985). 
 It is of importance to mention that the images were not put through rigorous 
testing to ensure the expressions match precisely to the morphological configurations that 
have been found for each of the different emotion expressions. I relied on the judgments 
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of laypeople (college undergraduates) to determine if the images of facial expressions I 
chose to depict the emotions reliably signaled the emotions intended. This aspect is 
important because the majority of previous studies utilized images that were tested to 
ensure that the facial configurations were precise, prototypical, posed depictions of the 
intended emotions (e.g., Russell & Bullock, 1985; Widen & Russell, 2008). This study, 
however, could have increased external validity due to the fact that the facial expressions 
we encounter in daily life are not prototypical. They are not posed or produced by a 
computer program, but are often spontaneous, and can be both valid signaling cues, 
indicating the true emotions of the expresser, and deliberately misleading cues. As 
mentioned by Izard (1994), emotions vary significantly in the intensity in which they are 
felt and expressed. It is important to attempt to utilize images of facial expressions that 
represent the range of the realistic expression of emotions that occurs in everyday 
encounters, instead of relying heavily on averaged depictions. 
Hypotheses 
 The overarching prediction was that language complexity would predict 
performance at all levels of abstraction in the natural and emotion concept 
discriminations, but could have the greatest impact at the most abstract levels, which 
depend more heavily on language and less on perceptual features. Specifically, it was 
hypothesized that as language complexity increased, so too would performance on the 
concept discrimination tasks, with this increase in performance being most pronounced 
for more abstract level categories. This hypothesis is in line with the Linguistic Relativity 
Hypothesis, which states that language impacts the way in which the speaker thinks and, 
in turn, how concepts are formed (i.e., Lindquist et al., 2006; Plunkett et al., 2008; Wolff 
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& Holmes, 2011; Zhang & Schmitt, 1998). While I predicted no differences between ages 
or genders, the variables were included in the model as they could influence the impact of 
language on concept ability. Language should be the primary predictor of concept ability 
and mediate effects of age and gender. 
 Test of the “language as an augmenter” hypothesis. Language can highlight 
commonalities between category members that are not obvious by perception alone (e.g., 
warm-blooded) (Wolff & Holmes, 2011). Along this vein, it could be predicted that 
language could play an influential role in the discrimination of concepts that are more 
abstract, in other words, that share fewer perceptual commonalities within and between 
categories (e.g., animals versus nonanimals). Whereas, it could play a less important role 
in the discrimination of more concrete concepts that contain more perceptual similarities 
within and between categories, and are easily differentiated by salient perceptual cues, 
such as coloration (e.g., lions versus tigers).  
 It is, in turn, predicted that the language complexity will have a greater impact on 
the superordinate level natural and emotion concept discriminations than they will on the 
subordinate level discriminations. It is the within category dissimilarity, rather than the 
distinction between categories, that could necessitate language as an augmenter to help 
highlight the commonalities between members that might not obviously be connected by 
perception alone. For instance, determining the categorical relationship between an insect 
and a mammal may be less obvious than determining the relationship between a lion and 
a domesticated housecat. Given that the basic level categories (cats versus dogs) originate 
from the same parent superordinate category, they share perceptual similarities between 
categories. In addition, there is a greater degree of perceptual overlap between exemplars 
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within basic level categories. Therefore, performance in this task could be less affected 
by language use.    
 Emotion concept discrimination predictions – Tests of the Circumplex model. If 
the predictions of the Circumplex model (Russell & Bullock, 1985) hold true for this 
sample, the children in all age groups should show similar patterns of responses and 
errors when performing the tasks. Based on this model, it was expected that the best 
performance should be on the basic level of abstraction, regardless of age – positive 
versus negative facial expressions – due to the fact that young children parse different 
emotions based on the dimensions of pleasure and displeasure, creating two broad, 
inclusive concepts for positive emotions (happy and surprise) and negative emotions 
(anger and sadness). It was also predicted that the most errors would be seen on the 
subordinate level discriminations. Despite the fact that anger is one of the first emotions 
to emerge as a distinct emotion, if fear has yet to be differentiated from other negative 
emotions, confusions will still occur at this level of abstraction (Widen & Russell, 2008). 
Performance on the superordinate level discrimination is predicted to be in between the 
basic level and the subordinate level performance or indistinguishable from the basic 
level due to the high degree of inclusiveness captured in this discrimination.  
 However, if emotion recognition is biologically based, innate, and an evolutionary 
adaptation for survival as predicted by the IUH (Ekman, 1993, 1999; Izard, 1994), then 
from early in development, faces are predicted to provide cues to the internal emotional 
state of an individual. These basic emotions, including happiness, sadness, anger, and 
surprise, are predicted to be differentiable from each other even in the youngest of 
participants (Ekman, 1993, 1999; Izard, 1994). Therefore, children’s performance on the 
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subordinate level (anger v. sadness) was predicted to be significantly above the level 
expected by chance alone, regardless of age, due to the fact that the emotion concepts are 
clearly distinguished from birth. 
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CHAPTER II 
METHODS 
Participants 
 There were 74 total participants ranging in age from 2:0 to 5:6 years old. Five 
two-year-olds (three males and two females ranging in age from 2:0 to 2:11), 39 three-
year-olds (16 males and 23 females from 3:0 to 3:11), 23 four-year-olds (11 males and 12 
females from 4:0 to 4:11), and seven five-year-olds (two males and five females from 5:0 
to 5:6) were recruited from daycares and private schools in Mobile, Alabama, Ocean 
Springs, Mississippi, and the surrounding areas. Only children whose primary language is 
English participated in the study. In addition, children with a diagnosis of any language 
or cognitive impairments that could impact performance were not included in the study. 
There were no other constraints or restrictions on participation. Conformity to these 
selection criteria was determined through a short demographic survey given to the parents 
with the consent package containing the informed consent information and permission 
form.  
Undergraduate Sample for Norming the Emotion Concept Images 
  One hundred and fifteen undergraduates with approximately 75% females and 
25% males were recruited from the undergraduate psychology subject pool at The 
University of Southern Mississippi. There were no specific selection requirements for the 
undergraduates to participate beyond being over the age of eighteen. They received two 
experimental credit points towards their course grade for their participation in the 
norming of the emotion concept discrimination images.  
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Apparatus, Materials, and Stimuli 
Norming of Emotion Concept Discrimination Images 
  Prior to choosing the images for the emotion concept discriminations, it was 
necessary to ensure the facial expressions in the images were rated by adults as 
portraying the intended emotion. These images were uploaded to an online survey site, 
Qualtrics.com. The participants were directed to the site from the SONA system. Prior to 
beginning the task, they were required to electronically provide a signature on the 
informed consent document. They were then directed to view each image, presented 
individually, and determine which of seven emotions were being depicted by the images.  
 For each of the seven facial expressions (happy, sad, angry, fear, surprise, 
amusement, and neutral), the participants were shown 152 total, 400 X 600 mp images 
that were downloaded from Google Image search and cropped using Microsoft Office 
Picture Manager to include only faces or faces and upper torso only. This number 
included the number of images for each expression that were needed in the computer 
tasks plus five extra images to account for any ambiguous (unknown) ratings. They were 
asked to classify the images as portraying a happy, sad, fearful, surprised, amused, angry, 
neutral, or unknown face. The ratings for each face were downloaded to an Excel 
spreadsheet and analyzed to determine if the images portrayed the intended emotions 
(70% of participants agreed upon emotion expressed). Experimental credit points to help 
fulfill course experimental opportunity points were awarded for participation.  
Concept Discrimination Tasks  
 The computer tasks were presented on a Panasonic Toughbook CF 18 Laptop 
Computer. Experiments were programmed using RealBasic 2006 for Windows. Stimuli 
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for the natural concept formation discriminations consisted of two-dimensional 
photographs that were similar to those used by Vonk and colleagues (2012, 2013) while 
the stimuli for the emotion concept discriminations had not been used previously.  For the 
three natural concept discriminations, the images depicted the animals from a variety of 
perspectives and orientations including close-ups, whole body, side views, head only, and 
so on, to help control for the possibility that a single perceptual feature (such as tails) 
could be utilized to distinguish between the stimuli. For the subordinate level 
discrimination, there were twenty images of lions and twenty images of tigers. The basic 
level discrimination consisted of twenty images of felines/cats that included novel images 
of both lions and tigers in addition to a variety of other members of the Felidae family 
versus twenty images of canines/dogs that could include wolves, foxes, domestic dogs 
and other members of the Canidae family. The superordinate level discrimination 
included twenty images of animals including felines and canines plus other taxonomic 
groups such as primates, reptiles, birds, insects, etc., versus twenty images of nonanimals 
that could include foods, dwellings, plants, statues, clothing, etc.  
 For the emotion concept discriminations, the images for the most subordinate 
level discrimination consisted of twenty images of facial expressions of anger versus 
sadness. For the basic level discrimination, the images were faces (some close-up faces 
and some upper body shots including the face and the upper torso) depicting two positive 
facial expressions (ten happy and ten positive surprise) versus twenty images depicting 
two negative facial expressions (ten angry and ten sad). The superordinate level 
discrimination included twenty images containing all four facial expressions from the 
previous level of abstraction (five of each - happy, positive surprise, anger, and sadness) 
61 
 
versus twenty images depicting neutral facial expressions (non-emotion). Although the 
images depicted the same categories as used in other discriminations, novel images were 
used for each discrimination. The images for both the basic and superordinate level 
discriminations were cropped to show only the head region or the head and part of the 
upper torso. The images were from slightly varying angles with some being the head 
facing straight ahead and some with the head slightly turned, but both eyes still visible 
and some being more close-up than others. All images, however, had to have the entire 
face visible to be included. The categories increased in level of abstraction and degree of 
inclusiveness from subordinate to superordinate with the subordinate having the lowest 
level of both abstraction and inclusiveness and superordinate containing the highest level 
of both abstraction and inclusiveness. 
 If the child made an incorrect choice, the computer produced an unpleasant 
buzzing sound, and the experimenter told the child to try again. If the child made a 
correct response, the computer produced a pleasant tone, and the experimenter told the 
child that he or she did a good job. Additionally, after a correct choice a short amusing 
video clip was played immediately after the pleasant tone. For the first five correct 
choices, a video clip of a cat jumping out of a box was played. The next six correct 
choices were reinforced with a clip of a kitten being tickled. And the next nine correct 
responses were reinforced with video of a hamster doing back flips. Stickers were also 
used as reinforcement for correct responses. Snack-size plastic zipper bags were used to 
contain the child’s stickers during testing. 
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Language Complexity  
 Selections from the IED-II (Brigance, 2004) were utilized to measure language 
complexity (described in a previous section). The materials were kept in a two-inch 
binder. The materials were simply the images printed on cardstock provided by the 
authors of the measure, but some tasks required utilizing outside materials. In order to 
assess the child’s knowledge of body parts, the child was asked to point to the part of 
their body named by the experimenter or name parts of the experimenter’s body when 
indicated. A PowerPoint presentation on the Panasonic ToughBook was utilized to 
present images from the quantitative concepts section. These images included such 
images as a full versus an empty glass/box, a small versus a large animal, a tall versus a 
short building, a box with more versus less kittens, etc. Additionally, seven paper clips 
and two pencils (one short and one long) were utilized in the quantitative concepts 
section. Children received stickers as reinforcement sporadically throughout the task to 
maintain motivation. The children received the stickers regardless of their performance 
on the measures.  
Procedure 
 In order for a child to participate, their parents must have returned the consent 
form, which was distributed by the facility prior to beginning testing, to the experimenter. 
The consent packet also included a short demographic survey containing the child’s 
name, birthday, primary language spoken in the home, questions regarding any diagnosed 
language or cognitive impairments, socioeconomic status of the family, and parents’ level 
of education.  
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 After receiving the signed consent forms, the testing occurred at the child’s school 
or daycare facility during regular school hours with testing occurring over an average of 
two days with one to two testing sessions per week (depending upon the facility), per 
child and with each testing session taking approximately thirty to forty-five minutes to 
conduct. The child was removed from his or her regular classroom activities for testing 
and taken to a room where the testing materials were set up. Before beginning any testing 
the child was asked to give their assent to participate and had the purpose of the study 
and the informed consent information explained to them in terms he or she could 
understand. It was emphasized that they did not have to answer any questions if they did 
not want to do so, could stop the testing at any point, and could take breaks if they needed 
or wanted to do so.  
Procedure for the Norming of the Emotion Concept Images 
 The images were uploaded onto a secure online survey site, providing the 
participants the opportunity to participate from any location with Internet access. Before 
being able to proceed to the images, the participants were required to give their electronic 
consent to participate. They were given the opportunity to read and print the informed 
consent document, which emphasized that they could stop participating at any point. 
Each image was then presented one following the other on the page in the same serial 
order for all participants, and a scale was provided for the participants to classify the 
images as portraying a happy, sad, fearful, angry, surprised, amused, neutral, or unknown 
facial expression. All basic and one derived emotion were included initially. Upon 
completion of the experiment, the participants received experimental credit points to 
contribute to their course experimental participation requirement. 
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 After the completion of testing, the responses were analyzed by the experimenter. 
Only images that were rated as portraying the intended emotion by 70% of the 
undergraduates were utilized in the emotion concept discriminations. Any images that did 
not meet this criterion were not utilized as images in the tasks for the children. It was 
found that fear was not distinguishable from other negative emotions, nor was 
amusement clearly distinguishable from other positive emotions. These emotions were 
then excluded from the categories for the children’s tasks; therefore, the facial 
expressions utilized for the concept discrimination tasks were anger, sadness, happiness, 
positive surprise, and neutral.  
Experimental Design 
 The order in which the child received the concept tasks was randomized and 
counterbalanced between subjects and within age groups to control for order effects. The 
IED-II (Brigance, 2004) was administered on a separate testing day approximately one 
week after completion of the concept tasks due to the late inclusion of this task to the 
project. Each of the two-alternative, forced choice tasks contained twenty trials. The tasks 
contained forty images total for each of the three discriminations: twenty correct stimuli 
(S+) and twenty incorrect stimuli (S–). The order in which the participants received each 
of the three levels of abstraction was counterbalanced across participants to control for 
and investigate any possible order effects. There were six possible orders in which the 
children could have received the discriminations (subordinate, basic, superordinate).  
 Within the subordinate level natural concept discrimination, approximately half of 
the participants were assigned lions as the S+ with tigers as the S-, and half were assigned 
tigers as the S+ with lions as the S-. For the basic level discrimination, all the participants 
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were reinforced for choosing felines/cats with canines/dogs as the S- as this category is 
inclusive of the subordinate level categories (lions versus tigers). At the superordinate 
level all the children were reinforced for choosing animals with nonanimals as the S- 
again due to the fact that this category is the parent category of both the lower level 
categories. The side location (left or right) of the S+ was counterbalanced within the 
tasks. Images were randomly paired and presented on each trial with no images repeated 
within or between tasks. 
 For the subordinate level emotion concept discrimination, approximately half 
were reinforced for choosing facial expressions depicting anger with expressions 
depicting sadness as the S-, and half were reinforced for choosing facial expressions 
depicting sadness with expressions depicting anger as the S-. The basic level followed the 
same pattern with all reinforced for choosing negative facial expressions with positive 
facial expressions as the S- due to the fact that the subordinate level categories (anger and 
sadness) are included within the negative emotions category. At the superordinate level, 
all participants in each age group were reinforced for choosing facial expressions clearly 
depicting different emotion states with faces that do not clearly depict an emotion (non-
emotions) as the S-. The emotion category was also based on the structure of the two 
lower level categories being derived from this parent category of emotions. The side 
position of the correct matches (S+) were counterbalanced within each session of each 
task, and images were randomly paired and presented on each trial with no images 
repeated within or between tasks.  
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Procedure for Natural and Emotion Concept Discriminations  
 The procedure was the same for both the natural and emotion concept 
discrimination tasks. The child was removed from his or her regular classroom for the 
duration of the testing session and brought to the testing room. Each child was tested 
individually in a quiet room in order to eliminate as much distraction as possible. The 
child was asked if he or she wanted to “play my games with me,” and if the answer was 
affirmative, a brief discussion ensued regarding how to play the “games.” The child was 
seated at a desk beside (or cattycorner to) the experimenter and in front of the computer. 
All responses by the child were made by using a stylus on the touchscreen monitor. The 
experimenter set up the session by choosing the appropriate S+ and S- as determined by 
the trial configuration for that child’s participant number. This was done with the 
computer screen facing away from the child as to not accidentally prime the child if he or 
she could read.  
 Before starting the session, the experimenter explained the “game” by saying, 
“We are going to play a picture game today.” Then the experimenter set up a 
demonstration task, using categories that the child was not tested on (primates versus 
non-primates). The experimenter then introduced “magic pencil” (the stylus) and told 
them that they were supposed to use it to touch the screen and make their choices. Then, 
she stated, as the demonstration images appeared, “You are going to see two pictures on 
the computer screen. Your job is to pick the picture that makes the computer beep.” She 
then chose the correct image and stated, “If you make the computer beep, a silly video 
will play and you will get a sticker in your sticker bag.” She then stated, as she chose an 
incorrect image, “But, if you make the computer buzz, you won’t get a sticker, but you 
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can keep trying and try to get stickers next time.” Then the experimenter allowed the 
child to try. She handed the child the stylus and asked them, “Which one do you think 
will make the computer beep so we can see a silly video?” The child was allowed to 
choose until they got one correct, and guidance was provided if necessary. The 
experimenter then asked the child if he or she understood how to play and if so, began the 
session. If not, the child was allowed to ask questions to clarify the instructions. 
 The child was then required to make an orienting response by touching a black 
screen with the stylus to initiate the first trial. After they touched the screen, two images 
appeared, and the child was to choose one of them using the stylus. If the child did not 
immediately make a choice, the experimenter prompted he or she to pick the picture they 
thought would make the computer beep with the “magic pencil.” The experimenter gave 
the child no cues as to what was correct or incorrect. If the child asked the experimenter 
any questions regarding which one was correct, the experimenter simply said, “Which 
one do you think is right?” There was no time limit set in the computer program for them 
to make a response. If after thirty seconds the child had made no attempt to respond, the 
experimenter asked the child if he or she still wanted to play the game to make sure they 
still wanted to participate.  
 If the image chosen by the child represented an image from the S+ category, the 
computer emitted a pleasant tone, the amusing video clip played, and the experimenter 
put a sticker in the child’s sticker bag and told them “Good job!” If the child made an 
incorrect choice, the computer produced an unpleasant buzzing sound, the screen became 
black and displayed the trial number and the word incorrect, and the experimenter said to 
the child “Oops! That’s okay! Try again!” There was no correction procedures if the trial 
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was incorrect; therefore, the next trial proceeded as usual until all twenty trials were 
complete for that session. The next discriminations were then administered as determined 
by random test orderings. The child was reminded of the task instructions prior to each 
new discrimination task if deemed necessary from their performance and attention level.  
The procedure for all discriminations was the same. The only prompt the 
experimenter gave was reminding them to pick the picture that they think would make the 
computer beep if they did not make a choice after approximately ten seconds between 
trials. The experimenter responded to any questions regarding which picture was correct 
with, “Which one do you think is right?” After completion of a set of three tasks 
(emotion or natural discriminations), the child was asked if he or she needed to take a 
break. If so, a three to five minute break began where the child was allowed to go to the 
restroom, stand up and stretch, etc. If not, the experimenter began the next three 
discrimination tasks. If the child was fatigued or did not want to keep participating, the 
session was discontinued for the day and restarted on the next day of testing.    
Procedure for the IED-II  
 After the child was finished with all six concept discrimination tasks, the measure 
of language complexity was administered. There was a possible total composite score of 
224 for the measure. The child was brought into the same room as was used in the 
computer tasks and was seated either beside or cattycorner to the experimenter. The child 
was given a new sticker bag to hold his or her stickers and was told that we were going to 
play a word game. The first task that was administered was a receptive vocabulary test 
(twenty-seven possible points) where the child was shown a page of nine images and 
asked to point at the image that depicted the word produced by the experimenter. There 
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were twenty-seven images total on three pages. The words for each page were presented 
in a pseudo-random order for each participant, meaning that the experimenter asked the 
child to point to the images in whatever order she determined, but not the same order 
each time. The child received stickers after completion of this task, regardless of 
performance. 
 The same twenty-seven images were used for the productive vocabulary measure, 
but instead of pointing to the image as the experimenter labeled them, the child was asked 
to name the images as the experimenter pointed at them. Again the images were pointed 
to in a pseudo-random order. After completion of the initial task, the children were asked 
twelve questions regarding the images on each page (six for page one and three for pages 
two and three) to test for deeper comprehension of the meaning and utility of the 
words/items. For example, the child was asked to point to all the pets shown on the first 
page of images and asked which animals had two feet and two wings on the third page. 
For both tasks, if the child was incorrect on three consecutive items, the testing was 
discontinued. The questions were asked after the productive vocabulary task and were 
added into that component score (thirty-nine possible points towards composite score). 
The child received stickers after completion of this task, regardless of performance. 
 The child’s knowledge of plurals (-s) and present participles (-ing), prepositions 
(up, down, in[side], and out[side]), and irregular plural nouns (feet and mice) were 
measured by asking the child questions about images (eight possible points). For the 
plural –s, the experimenter pointed to an image of two kittens and asked the child, “What 
are these?” If the child responded with cats, kittens, kitty-cats, or kitties, the response was 
counted as accurate. If the child responded with another animal, but with the correct 
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plural suffix (-s), the experimenter asked them, “What are those again?” with a quizzical 
look on her face to see if that would elicit the correct label, but the response was counted 
as accurate and they moved on to the present participle –ing image. If the child did not 
use the correct suffix, they were given the option to re-try with a second image depicting 
two keys. The same process was followed with that image. Also, the same procedure was 
followed for the images for the –ing suffix, except the question was phrased as what is 
the person in the image doing. The first image was of a little boy splashing in a puddle, 
and the child was asked, “What is this little boy doing?” Any response using the suffix –
ing was accepted as accurate. If the child did not use the proper suffix, the experimenter 
asked a similar question about the second image of a little girl walking and holding a 
doll. These images could add two possible points towards the composite score. 
 To assess preposition use, an image depicting a boy going upstairs and a girl 
going downstairs was shown. The experimenter pointed to the boy in the picture and 
asked the child, “What is this little boy doing?” Then the child was asked, as the 
experimenter pointed to the girl, “What is this little girl doing?” The accurate response 
was supposed to contain up and down. Each question was considered a separate response 
contributing to the composite score. Next the experimenter directed the child’s attention 
to a picture depicting one kitten inside a box and one kitten outside a box. This image 
assessed the child’s use of the prepositions in(side) and out(side) by pointing to the kitten 
in the box and asking the child, “Where is this kitten?” then pointing to the kitten outside 
of the box and asking, “Where is THIS kitten?” If the child used the proper preposition, it 
was counted as accurate and contributed two points towards the child’s composite score. 
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 The final part of this section examined the child’s use of irregular plural nouns. 
The child was first shown an image of two sets of feet. The experimenter pointed to the 
feet and asked the child, “What are these?” One point towards the composite score was 
added if the child responded with the word “feet,” not foots, feets, or foot. The second 
image depicted three mice, and the experimenter circled all three with her finger while 
asking, “What are these?” If the child called them mice, not mouses or mouse, then a 
point was added to their composite score. If the child called the animals rats, the 
experimenter pointed at one of the mice and said, “This is a mouse, so what are these 
called?” If the child persisted in calling the animals rats, the response was counted as 
inaccurate. The child received stickers after completion of this task, regardless of 
performance. 
 As a part of the child’s receptive and productive vocabulary score, the next task 
assessed the child’s knowledge of parts of the body. For the receptive task, the 
experimenter told the child that we are going to play a silly game where they pointed to 
things or showed me things. The child was then asked to point to or show the 
experimenter individual parts of their body. There were twenty-nine possible points 
available for this section. The parts of the body used were as follows: eyes, nose, mouth, 
hair, feet, ears, tongue, head, legs, arms, fingers, teeth, thumbs, toes, neck, stomach, 
chest, back, knees, chin, fingernails, heels, ankles, jaw, shoulders, elbows, hips, wrists, 
and waist. If the child missed three items consecutively, testing for this section was 
discontinued. For the productive section of the parts of the body, the experimenter would 
point to the part of the body she wanted the child to label and ask, “What is this?” All of 
the same parts of the body were used as in the receptive section except tongue and teeth; 
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therefore, this section contributed twenty-seven possible points towards the child’s 
composite score. The same discontinue rule was used in the productive section. The child 
received stickers after completion of this task, regardless of performance. 
 Also as a part of productive and receptive vocabulary, the next task measured 
quantitative concepts. This measure included questions regarding the following 
quantitative contrasts: big/little, one/one more, full/empty, heavy/light, tall/short, fat/thin, 
fast/slow, all/none, long/short, large/small, deep/shallow, thick/thin, wide/narrow, 
more/less, many/few, huge/tiny, and most/least. To assess the child’s comprehension of 
the contrast between big and little, an image of two big cats and two little cats was shown 
to the child. The experimenter asked, “Show me the big cat. Which cats are big?” If the 
child pointed to the big cats, the response was counted as accurate. Then the experimenter 
asked, “Show me the little cat. Which cats are little?” If the child pointed to the little cats, 
the response was counted as accurate. This image was the only one provided by the 
author.  
 The remaining contrasts were assessed using either a PowerPoint presentation 
depicting images that fit the criterion provided by the author or by using real stimuli. For 
instance, to assess one and one more, the experimenter placed four-six paper clips in front 
of the child then asked the child, “Would you please hand me one of these?” If the child 
handed the experimenter only one of the paper clips, the response was counted as 
accurate. Then the experimenter asked the child, “Would you please hand me one more?” 
If the child handed the experimenter only one more of the paper clips, the response was 
counted as accurate.  
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 Some items were asked in order to measure receptive vocabulary while others 
were asked in a way to assess the child’s ability to produce quantitative words. As an 
example, to assess the child’s concepts of all versus none, the experimenter would ask the 
child, “How many cars on the road have wheels?” If the child responded with an answer 
containing the word “all,” the response was counted as correct. Then the experimenter 
would ask them, emphasizing the silliness of the question, “How many cars on the road 
have legs?” If the child’s answer contained the word “none” or words ”not any,” it was 
counted as correct. An answer of “no” was not counted as correct as it is not a 
quantitative term. If the child made two consecutive incorrect responses, testing was 
discontinued for this section. In total, these items could contribute thirty-four possible 
points towards the child’s composite score. The child received stickers after completion 
of this task, regardless of performance. 
 In order to assess some of the more applied or practical aspects of language, the 
classifying task examined the child’s understanding of the following sixteen semantic 
categories: animals, toys, means of travel, clothes, foods, dishes, people, pets, numbers, 
things to read, fruits, vegetables, tools, furniture, shapes, and musical instruments. Each 
page contained twelve images, three of each semantic category. The experimenter would 
then ask the child to point to all the category members on each page. In order for the 
child’s response to be considered correct, he or she must have chosen either all three of 
the category members or two of three of the category members. If the child chose none of 
the three possible members or only one of the three members for two consecutive 
categories, testing was discontinued for this section. The child could earn a possible 
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sixteen points towards his or her composite score in this section. The child received 
stickers after completion of this task, regardless of performance. 
 The next section also assessed the child’s practical language comprehension and 
production. In this section, the child was asked what he or she should do given a specific 
circumstance. There were fourteen questions including questions such as, “What do you 
do when you are sleepy?” and “What should you do if you cut/get a booboo on your 
finger?” The experimenter counted the child’s response as correct if they were 
appropriate given the situation (e.g., “go take a nap” and “get a Band-Aid”). If the child 
was inaccurate on two consecutive questions, testing was discontinued for this section. 
The child received stickers after completion of this task, regardless of performance. 
 The final section was an additional measure of the child’s practical understanding 
and utilization of language by assessing the child’s knowledge of the use of common 
objects. There were two pages of images, one with eight images (chairs, cars, beds, 
houses, pencils, dishes, coats, and stoves) and the second with seven images (book, 
phone, scissors, key, refrigerator, airplane, and clock). To assess the child’s expressive 
understanding, the experimenter would point to each image and ask the child, “Why do 
we have __________?” The child was to respond with some function of the item depicted 
in order for their response to be counted as accurate. If the child responded inaccurately 
to three consecutive questions, testing was discontinued for the receptive component of 
the task. After completion of the expressive component of this task, the child’s receptive 
ability to indicate the item that matched the description of the use of each of the items 
was measured. The experimenter would ask the child, “Show me what we (e.g., sleep 
on).” This request was made for each of the items on the page in a pseudo-random order. 
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The same discontinue rule was used for the receptive component. The child could earn 
thirty possible points total towards their composite score during this task. The child 
received stickers after completion of this task, regardless of performance.            
Data Analysis 
Variables in the Model 
 The dependent variable was performance, in the form of percent correct on each 
of the three natural concept discrimination tasks and the three emotion concept 
discrimination tasks. The within-subjects independent variables were type of stimulus 
(natural, emotion) and level of abstraction (subordinate, basic, superordinate). Age, 
gender, and composite language complexity score were the between subjects independent 
variables.  
Analyses for the Hypotheses 
 To test the main hypotheses a mixed model factorial ANOVA was conducted with 
the specific predictor variables of interest for each hypothesis, and the dependent variable 
entered in the model. As language complexity is a continuous variable, it was entered in 
the model first as a covariate then a specific model was built which allowed for the 
interactions between it and the other independent variables to be investigated. This 
technique is highly utilized in social psychology research and forces SPSS to treat the 
continuous variables as a discrete variable in the model (Wuensch & Everhart, 2006).  
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CHAPTER III 
 
RESULTS 
 
Tests of the Language as an Augmenter Hypothesis 
 A mixed model factorial ANOVA of performance on the concept tasks with 
language complexity, age, and sex as between subjects factors, and type of concept 
(natural, emotion) and level of abstraction (subordinate, basic, and subordinate) as within 
subjects factors indicated that, contrary to the language as an augmenter hypothesis, there 
was no main effect of language complexity, F (2, 130) = 2.051, p = 0.137. There were 
also no significant main effects of age, F (3, 65) = 0.681, p = 0.567, or sex, F (1, 65) = 
0.628, p = 0.431. Refer to Appendix A for a full table of descriptive statistics for the 
model. Table 1 provides the descriptive statistics for language complexity as a function of 
sex. Based on these statistics, it is unlikely that the lack of effect of language complexity 
is due to a lack of variability in the language complexity variable. 
Table 1 
Language complexity by sex. 
 
 
Sex 
 
 
 
Mean 
 
 
Standard Deviation 
Males 
 
162.844 34.915 
Females 
 
167.191 40.164 
Total 
 
165.311 37.795 
 
 
Figure 4 shows performance as a function of type of concept, level of abstraction, and sex 
of the child.  
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Figure 4. Performance as a function of type of concept, sex, and level of abstraction; A) 
natural concepts, B) emotion concepts. Error bars represent the standard deviation. The 
horizontal black line indicates chance level of performance of ten correct out of twenty 
trials. 
 
 Interestingly, there was an interaction between concept type and sex of the 
participant, F (1, 65) = 6.481, p = 0.013. Follow up ANOVAs for each concept type 
including sex, language complexity, and levels of abstraction as variables, indicated that 
there was no effect of sex on performance for the natural concept discriminations, F (1, 
65) = 0.603, p = 0.44, whereas there was a  main effect of sex on performance for the 
emotion concepts, F (1, 65) = 4.133, p = 0.046, with females performing significantly 
better (M = 10.635, SEM = 0.42) than males (M = 9.384, SEM = 0..463) at 
discriminating emotions. Figure 5 graphically illustrates this relationship. 
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Figure 5. Number correct by type of concept and sex. The error bars represent the 
standard error. The black horizontal line indicates chance level performance at ten trials 
correct out of twenty total trials.  
 
Tests of the Circumplex Model of Emotions 
 Tests of the Circumplex Model for the Emotion Category Discrimination would 
predict the best performance on the basic level concept discrimination (positive versus 
negative). A repeated measures ANOVA of performance on the Emotion Concept Task 
contrasting the three levels of abstraction (subordinate, basic, and superordinate – within 
subjects factors) and including age and sex as between subjects factors indicated a lack of 
support for the model, F(2, 146)=3.381, p=0.037, in that the best performance was 
actually with the subordinate level discrimination (angry versus sad, M = 10.811, SD = 
3.510), and lowest on the basic level discrimination (M = 9.446, SD = 2.445).  
 Post-hoc analyses, using Tukey’s least significant difference (LSD) tests, 
indicated that performance at the superordinate level of abstraction differed significantly 
from performance at the basic level of abstraction (LSD = 1.169, p = 0.027) with 
79 
 
performance at the superordinate level of abstraction better than performance at the basic 
level. Performance at the subordinate level also differed significantly from performance 
at the basic level (LSD = -1.141 p = 0.022) with performance at the subordinate level 
better than performance at the basic level. Taken together, the results provide some 
support for the Innateness Universality Hypothesis. Of note, however, the only scores 
that significantly differed from chance level performance (ten correct out of twenty trials) 
using one-sample t-tests were three-year-olds’ superordinate level performance, t (41) = 
2.423, p = 0.02, and four-year-olds’ subordinate level of performance, t (22) = 3.166, p = 
0.004 when categorizing on the basis of emotions. Both were significantly higher than 
chance level performance. Figure 6 graphically illustrates the relationship between 
performance as a function of levels of abstraction in the emotion concept discriminations. 
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Figure 6. Number correct by level of abstraction for the emotion concept discrimination 
tasks, where the horizontal black line indicates chance level performance of ten correct 
out of twenty total trials. The error bars represent the standard error. 
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Natural Concept Discrimination Performance 
 One sample t-tests performed on the natural concept level discrimination 
performances by age of the participants showed that only four-year-olds’ superordinate 
level performance was significantly above chance, t (22) = 2.426, p = 0.024.  
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CHAPTER IV 
DISCUSSION 
 The language as an augmenter hypothesis suggests that language, when present 
and intact, acts as a supplement to thought. Words provide anchors for concepts, 
providing the organizational structure upon which a concept can be built (Gelman & 
Markman, 1987; Plunkett et al., 2008; Wolff & Holmes, 2011; Zhang & Schmitt, 1998). 
In keeping with this hypothesis, the current study predicted that a higher language 
complexity score would predict higher performance on the concept discrimination tasks 
regardless of age, sex, type of concept (natural or emotion), and level of abstraction 
(subordinate, basic, and superordinate). However, the results provided no support for this 
hypothesis, with no significant main effect of language on concept discrimination 
performance for either the natural or emotion concept tasks.  
 Based on the current methodology where no words were provided for the 
categories, supporters of the LRH could argue that the reason for the lack of an observed 
relationship between language complexity and categorization could be due to the fact that 
children need a label upon which to construct the concept (Lindquist et al., 2006; Johnson 
et al., 1992; Russell & Bullock, 1985; Wolff & Holmes, 2011). Perhaps, language cannot 
be as readily used as an augmenter unless it is explicitly present during the task itself. 
Even if the child has the word in their verbal repertoire, it could be argued that in order to 
properly assess the effect of language on concept formation, the word anchoring the 
concept should be provided to the child before the task, allowing for a more direct test of 
the hypothesis. The effect of providing a verbal label could easily be assessed if, in 
addition to the IED-II language measures, one group of children is provided with the 
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corresponding verbal label for the categories prior to beginning each concept 
discrimination task. A control group would not be provided with verbal labels, as was the 
case for the current participants. If language was used as an augmenter, aiding in the 
discrimination and formation of concepts, the performance of the group given the labels 
for the categories should be greater than performance of the group not provided with the 
labels.  
 Alternatively, children could be asked to generate labels themselves during the 
task in an experimental group, and performance could be compared based on the facility 
and/or accuracy with which they performed the labeling task. One could also compare the 
performance of children with and without the capacity to generate labels, but it would be 
difficult to do so without the confound of age or other developmental delays. By the 
language as an augmenter hypothesis, being able to generate labels for the images could 
help facilitate the concept discrimination as the labels could provide an anchoring 
structure upon which to build the concept (Wolff & Holmes, 2011). Future work should 
investigate these possibilities. 
 It is also possible that language could play far less of a role than would be 
suggested by the LRH and the language as an augmenter hypothesis. The evidence from 
nonhuman animals, children with ASDs, and children born deaf without exposure to sign 
language suggests that natural concept formation is possible without linguistic influence 
(e.g., Gasteb et al., 2006; Goldin-Meadow et al., 2005; Roberts & Mazmanian, 1988). 
Premack (1983) suggested that the capacity for a symbolic system endows  humans, and 
perhaps symbol- trained animals, with the unique ability to think in abstract terms, 
indicating that nonhuman animals should not be able to form abstract, superordinate level 
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categories. Research has indicated, however, that several species of nonhuman animals 
can, indeed form superordinate level categories (Fabre-Thorpe et al., 1998; Roberts & 
Mazmanian, 1988; Vonk & MacDonald, 2002; Vonk et al., 2012), suggesting that 
language may not be as necessary as Premack (1983) and supporters of the LRH 
implicate. In addition, supporters of the IUH and the emotion recognition system assert 
that emotion discrimination is present and intact from birth, downplaying the impact of 
linguistic input on the ability to judge emotion based on facial expression alone (Ekman, 
1993; Izard, 1994). The fact that no relationship was found between language complexity 
and concept formation lends some support to the idea that concept formation, for both 
natural and emotion categories, could be an innate capacity impacted by experience with 
the environment and less reliant on language than is suggested by supporters of the LRH 
and the language as an augmenter hypothesis (Cimpian & Erickson, 2012; Mandler, 
1992). 
 One interesting interaction between concept type and sex emerged from the data 
whereby females scored significantly higher on the emotion concept discriminations than 
males. These results are supported by findings suggesting an early difference in the 
processing of facial expressions, where females are better able to decode and process 
emotions based on facial expressions and at an earlier age than males (Boyatzis, Chazan, 
& Ting, 1993; McClure, 2000; Schmidt & Cohn, 2001). These early differences in facial 
expression processing could be explained from a socialization perspective, suggesting 
that parents and society, at least in western societies, place greater emphasis on emotional 
sensitivity and responsiveness for females in comparison to males. Males experience a 
less emotionally enriched environment from birth onwards in comparison to females 
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(McClure, 2000; Schmidt & Cohn, 2001). From an evolutionary perspective, as females 
tend to be the primary caretakers of infants, they should have evolved specialized skills to 
aid in the survival of these infants. A very important skill for survival as social primates 
is the use, recognition, and interpretation of facial expressions as they serve as important 
nonverbal communicative cues from birth onwards (Babchuk, Hames, & Thompson, 
1985; Hamson, van Anders, & Mullin, 2006). Therefore, the current results, framed in a 
social and evolutionary perspective, appear to support previous findings, suggesting a 
female superiority for emotion recognition based on facial expressions.  
 Exploring performance on the emotion concepts further, the tenets of the 
Circumplex model of emotions were tested. The Circumplex model of emotions (Russell 
& Bullock, 1985) suggests that emotion categories based on different facial expressions 
fall into two bipolar dimensions based on valence (pleasure-displeasure) and vary in 
degree of arousal early in life. This model is an LRH model in that it is argued that 
exposure to language (learning the words for the different emotions) then differentiates 
the categories, creating the fully discriminated emotions we have as adults (Carroll & 
Russell, 1996; Russell & Bullock, 1985; Russell & Widen, 2002; Widen & Russell, 2003, 
2008, 2010). In contrast to this model, the IUH suggests that emotion recognition based 
on facial expressions is an innate capacity based on the possession of an emotion 
recognition system that is present and intact from birth (Ekman, 1999; Izard, 1994).  
 The current project tested the premise of the Circumplex model that emotion 
categories begin in undifferentiated, valence- based categories of pleasure and 
displeasure by establishing the basic level category of positive (happiness and surprise) 
and negative (anger and sadness) emotions. If the Circumplex model is an accurate 
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depiction of early emotion concepts, the results should have shown the best performance 
for the basic level discrimination. In contrast, the results showed that the best 
performance was obtained with the subordinate level discrimination of anger versus 
sadness. Importantly, post-hoc analyses indicated that the basic level category differed 
significantly from both the subordinate and superordinate level categories. These results 
indicate that, even at very young ages (two to five years), emotion concepts, specifically 
the negative emotions of anger and sadness, appear to be differentiated, providing some 
support for the IUH and the emotion recognition system. More work should be done to 
examine discriminations between all basic emotions. Evolutionarily speaking, having a 
quick, efficient method for interpreting emotional states from birth would be adaptive in a 
social species. Through facial expressions, humans have an efficient means for conveying 
information about affect without the necessity of language (Ekman, 1999; Izard, 1994). 
The current study provided a direct test of the Circumplex model utilizing a nonverbal 
task, methodology that is unique in the current literature. 
 In using a nonverbal task, the current study allows for assessing concept 
discrimination ability independently of language ability. Many other concept 
discrimination tasks, both for natural and emotion concepts (e.g., Carroll & Russell, 
1996; Gelman & Markman, 1987; Rosch et al., 1976; Russell & Bullock, 1985; Russell & 
Widen, 2002; Widen & Russell, 2003, 2008, 2010) relied heavily on both receptive and 
expressive language abilities. The children were given fairly complex verbal instructions 
prior to the tasks and many tasks required the children to respond verbally. The current 
study differentiates itself by using limited verbal instructions and requiring nonverbal 
responses from the child. These aspects of the task support its utilization with very young 
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children, and children with limited verbal abilities. An additional benefit to a nonverbal 
task is that it allows for more direct comparisons of abilities between humans and 
nonhuman animals. This basic task has been successfully utilized with nonhuman animals 
(Vonk et al., 2012; 2013; Vonk & MacDonald, 2002, 2004). In the nonhuman animal 
studies, the animals were tested continuously until they reached a set criterion at which 
point they were provided with a transfer task. Here, the children participated in only a 
single session to test for spontaneous rather than learned abilities. The methodology 
could easily be adapted to allow for direct comparisons to be made. Truly comparative 
methodologies are rare, but are necessary for understanding the phylogeny of cognition.  
 Although the inclusion of a nonverbal concept task is a benefit of the current 
study, it also has a downside. The children’s scores were on average close to chance level 
performance (ten out of twenty trials correct). One-way t-tests showed that the only 
performances that were significantly above chance level performance were: three-year-
olds’ performance on the emotion superordinate level discrimination (emotion versus 
neutral) and four-year-olds’ performance on the natural superordinate level 
discrimination (animals versus nonanimals) and the emotion concrete level 
discrimination (anger versus sadness). These scores indicate that the children did not 
successfully discriminate the concepts. It could be that the tasks, without explicit 
instructions, were too difficult for the age range tested. It could also be that if the children 
were given more sessions of the task, they could eventually discriminate the concepts at 
levels significantly above chance, but it is important to note that I was specifically 
interested in their spontaneous ability to discriminate the concepts. Allowing them to 
learn to discriminate the concepts would not be relevant to the main goal of the current 
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study. Furthermore, as mentioned previously, providing children with explicit 
instructions prior to completing the tasks (i.e., labeling the categories) could be extremely 
interesting and may more directly test the question asked by the current study, but doing 
so would also impact how the child responds, moving away from innate ability and 
looking more at a derived skill. The current methodology allows for the investigation of 
children’s innate ability to discriminate concepts as it relates to their language abilities. 
 An additional strength of the current study is the utilization of language 
complexity as the measure of language ability instead of focusing on the child’s receptive 
and expressive language ability only. Human language is, arguably, the most complex 
system of communication in the animal kingdom; it is far more than simply 
understanding and producing labels for objects. By utilizing a more inclusive language 
measure, the variable becomes more representative of the child’s actual language ability, 
increasing the external validity of the measure. In utilizing language complexity instead 
of more traditional measures, more complex analyses of the role of language in cognitive 
processes could be made. 
 Also increasing the external validity of the study is the use of facial expressions 
that were not overly standardized or computer-generated prototypical examples. 
Although examining processing of artificial and prototypical facial expressions has its 
place in the study of facial expression processing, the facial expressions that humans 
encounter on a daily basis are not prototypical or perfect examples of the facial 
configurations for each emotion. They are spontaneous expressions of emotion that can 
be both true depictions of the emotional state of the individual or misleading expressions 
meant to deceive the receiver of the information (Izard, 1994). The images used in this 
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study were naturalistic photographs gathered from internet search sites (e.g., Google 
Image) and judged as representing the intended emotion by laypeople (college 
undergraduates). These facial expressions could be more accurate representations of what 
children experience in their everyday lives relative to prototypical and/or artificial facial 
expressions, potentially providing a better measure of their abilities to judge emotions 
based on facial expressions. 
 Although the current study failed to find a significant relationship between 
children’s language complexity and their concept discrimination abilities, it is possible 
that children’s language abilities have less of an impact than does the language that they 
hear in their environments, specifically from their parents/caregivers. Research has 
indicated that parental, specifically maternal, language use has an effect on the child’s 
theory of mind (Cheung, 2010; de Rosnay et al., 2004; Watson et al., 2000) and emotion 
understanding (de Rosnay et al., 2004; Martin & Green, 2005; Mcquaid et al., 2007). 
Less is known about the impact of parental language use on natural concept formation. 
Future research should investigate the role of parental language use on natural concept 
formation in children. There could be sex differences in the types of labels used more 
frequently by parents. It could be that parents use more natural category labels when 
interacting with male children whereas they might use more emotion labels when 
interacting with female children, which could also help to explain the sex differences 
found in the current study. This possibility has been supported by research conducted 
with emotion recognition showing that mothers tend to use more elaborate emotion 
language with female children in comparison to male children (Cervantes & Callanan, 
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1998; Martin & Green, 2005). Less is known about natural categories, necessitating 
further investigation.  
 The main finding of this study is that language complexity appears to have no 
significant relationship to concept discrimination in young children - results that 
contradict the language as an augmenter hypothesis set forth by supporters of the LRH. 
These results provide some support for the arguments that the ability to organize 
information into concepts is an innate skill, not dependent on language (Cimpain & 
Erikson, 2012). The results also support the bottom-up argument for the formation of 
concepts, suggesting that children actively build concepts from perceptual features as 
they are perceiving the world (Cimpian & Erickson, 2012; Mandler, 1992). Perceptual 
features might play a more dominant role in concept formation for very young children, 
in contrast to linguistic input.  
 Despite the lack of relationship between language and concept formation found in 
this study, I hesitate to state that there is no relationship between language and concept 
formation. Language is a powerful force in a child’s life; children are exposed to it from 
the time their brains can perceive auditory information in utero and throughout their lives. 
It is possible that while perceptual features dominate how children form concepts early in 
life, that exposure to language could shape these concepts as the child develops. For more 
abstract concepts that involve less easily observable perceptual differences, language 
could play a stronger role in helping to anchor those concepts than for concepts easily 
formed by perceptual similarity (Vonk & Povinelli, 2006). Also for relational concepts, 
concepts formed by sharing common relational structures instead of common properties 
(e.g., a bird and a nest), language appears to help point out those underlying common 
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structures for young children (Bandurski & Galkowski, 2004; Gentner, Anggoro, & 
Klibanoff, 2011; Gentner & Kurtz, 2005). These findings suggest that we have merely 
just begun to scratch the surface of language’s role in concept formation, paving the way 
for a wide range of future investigations.     
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APPENDIX A 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR THE MODEL 
 
    Natural 
  Age Subordinate Basic Superordinate 
Males 2 8.667 (2.082) 5.667 (3.055) 14.0 (2.646) 
 3 9.563 (1.504) 10.625 (2.217) 10.563 (3.54) 
 4 8.636 (2.292) 9.364 (2.618) 12.546 (4.108) 
 5 11.5 (2.121) 10.5 (2.121) 10.0 (1.414) 
Females 2 8.50 (2.121) 8.0 (1.414) 9.0 (1.414) 
 3 10.217 (3.133) 9.782 (2.73) 10.565 (2.313) 
 4 10.083 (2.843) 9.667 (2.103) 11.5 (3.92) 
 5 9.8 (1.924) 8.6 (1.817) 10.6 (3.578) 
Total   9.716 (2.502) 9.608 (2.536) 11.095 (3.282) 
    Emotion 
  
Age Subordinate Basic Superordinate 
Males 2 9.0 (1.0) 9.0 (0.0) 10.333 (1.528) 
 3 10.375 (3.722) 9.75 (1.915) 9.813 (2.613) 
 4 11.546 (3.446) 8.182 (2.562) 9.546 (2.382) 
 5 8.5 (0.707) 8.5 (0.707) 9.0 (5.657) 
Females 2 8.5 (0.707) 10.5 (0.707) 11.0 (0.0) 
 3 10.174 (3.762) 9.696 (2.324) 11.652 (2.822) 
 4 12.583 (2.937) 10.167 (3.639) 11.583 (2.314) 
 5 12.2 (4.087) 8.6 (1.949) 11.6 (1.949) 
Total   10.811 (3.51) 9.446 (2.445) 10.784 (2.65) 
*Note:  The statistics presented are in the following format: mean (standard deviation).  
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APPENDIX B 
CONSENT PACK GIVEN TO PARENTS 
 
Letter to Parents from Facilities October	  22,	  2013	  	  Dear	  Parents,	  	  As	  you	  all	  know,	  we	  take	  our	  positions	  as	  caregivers/educators	  of	  your	  children	  very	  seriously	  and	  we	  love	  our	  work.	  We	  are	  continually	  updating	  and	  improving	  our	  practices	  and	  materials	  to	  provide	  the	  best	  for	  your	  children’s	  growth	  and	  development.	  	  That	  said,	  Stephanie	  E.	  Jett	  is	  a	  Doctoral	  Student	  in	  the	  department	  of	  Psychology	  at	  the	  University	  of	  Southern	  Mississippi,	  who	  is	  conducting	  a	  dissertation	  in	  the	  area	  of	  cognitive	  development.	  She	  recently	  approached	  us	  with	  a	  research	  idea	  for	  our	  children.	  We	  would	  like	  to	  invite	  your	  child	  to	  participate	  in	  two	  	  30-­‐40	  minute	  (on	  average),	  one-­‐on-­‐one	  session	  to	  learn	  about	  their	  understanding	  of	  natural	  and	  emotion	  concepts/categories	  and	  how	  these	  abilities	  interact	  with	  language.	  It	  is	  suspected	  that	  language	  affects	  how	  early	  language	  learners	  (two-­‐	  to	  five-­‐year-­‐olds)	  group	  things	  into	  categories,	  but	  the	  particular	  aspects	  of	  language	  that	  contribute	  to	  this	  categorization	  remains	  unclear.	  If	  we	  can	  better	  understand	  this	  relationship	  between	  language	  and	  concepts,	  we	  will	  better	  understand	  how	  concepts	  for	  natural	  categories	  and	  emotions	  are	  formed	  and	  utilized.	  Please	  see	  the	  attached	  University	  of	  Southern	  Mississippi	  consent	  form	  with	  more	  of	  the	  research	  specifics	  and	  procedures.	  	  Our	  center	  approves	  the	  participation	  of	  your	  child	  in	  these	  computer-­‐testing	  sessions.	  The	  sessions	  will	  take	  place	  during	  the	  regular	  school	  time	  in	  an	  area	  adjacent	  to	  the	  classroom	  over	  the	  next	  several	  weeks.	  Your	  child	  will	  not	  miss	  any	  free	  or	  outside	  play	  time,	  or	  any	  critical	  testing	  material.	  Feel	  free	  to	  contact	  Stephanie	  or	  her	  supervisor,	  Dr.	  Heidi	  Lyn,	  with	  any	  questions	  about	  the	  project	  (email:	  stephanie.jett@eagles.usm.edu	  or	  cell:	  251-­‐490-­‐3433;	  Dr.	  Lyn	  email:	  heidi.lyn@usm.edu	  or	  office:	  228.214.3234).	  	  If	  you	  would	  like	  your	  child	  to	  participate,	  please	  sign	  the	  attached	  consent	  form	  allowing	  your	  child	  to	  participate	  and	  return	  to	  us	  this	  week.	  	  Thank	  you	  in	  advance	  for	  your	  assistance.	  	  ________________________________________	  	   ______________________________________________	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INFORMED CONSENT FORM 
 
Title of Research Project: LNEC12 
 
Project Contact: Stephanie E. Jett, M.S., Experimental Psychology Ph.D. Program, The University of 
Southern Mississippi. 251-490-3433 or stephanie.jett@eagles.usm.edu. 
 
Purpose of the Project: The purpose of this work is to investigate the role of language complexity on 
natural and emotion concept formation in early language learners (two- to five-year-olds). Using six (three 
natural and three emotion) tasks presented on a touch screen computer, children will be asked to choose 
one of two images that are presented simultaneously that represent different concepts. Only one concept 
will be considered correct.   Three of the tasks will present the children with pictures of different animals 
and three tasks will present them with pictures of human emotion expressions. We are interested in how 
language complexity might predict performance on these categorization tasks. To assess language 
complexity we your child will be given an abbreviated version of the Brigance Early Childhood Screen II. 
This test measures aspects of language such as receptive and productive vocabulary, irregular noun use, 
quantity terms, etc. and will allow for a more comprehensive understanding of language’s effects on 
concept formation.  
 
Procedures: Your child will be asked to complete the six concept discrimination tasks described above on a 
touch screen computer. I will explain the tasks by stating that, “We are going to play a picture game on the 
computer. Your job is to choose the picture that makes the computer beep (correct choice).” All six tasks 
should take approximately 30-40 minutes to complete. Additionally, the Brigance will be administered in a 
separate session after completion of the computer tasks and will take approximately 20-30 minutes to 
complete. The child will be allowed to stop participating at any point and will not be penalized in any way. 
If the child does not complete all the tasks in one session, an additional session may be conducted to finish 
the remaining tasks if the child agrees to continue to participate. Performance on these tasks will not be 
used in any way to evaluate your child’s intelligence or academic performance. These two testing sessions 
will be conducted one-on-one with me in an office/classroom adjacent to the classroom area during regular 
school hours.  
 
Potential Risks or Discomforts: The risks involved for your child participating in the project are negligible. 
It is expected that they will find the tasks fun to complete. There is a chance they become discouraged if 
they select the wrong choices. However, they will be allowed to stop at any time if participating in the tasks 
makes them uncomfortable or if they refuse to respond. 
 
Potential Benefits: Your child should find the tasks fun to complete. Their responses are not graded by the 
teachers at ____________________, nor will they be used in any kind of assessment of their academic 
progress. However, your child’s participation will allow psychologists to better understand the particular 
way that language impacts the formation of these concepts. 
 
Voluntary Participation: The participation of the children is entirely voluntary, and participants can 
withdraw from the project at any time. Children will be asked to print their name or form some kind of 
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identifying mark on an assent form to indicate their intent to participate. Children will be told the purpose 
of the project and will be given the opportunity to ask questions and take breaks at any point during the 
one-on-one session which will last, on average, 30-40 minutes. The session to administer the Brigance 
should take on average, 20-30 minutes. Additionally, you, as the parent, may refuse to respond to any 
questions on the demographic survey and/or withdraw your participation at any time without penalty for 
you or your child.  
 
Protection of Confidentiality: All of the information that is collected will be kept strictly confidential. An 
ID number will be created for your child at the beginning of the study. All data is stored according to the 
ID #, not participant names. At the conclusion of data collection for this study, all identifying information 
will be deleted. Data gathered from the present study will be stored in a secure location for six years, at 
which time it will be destroyed. THE DATA MAY BE VIEWED BY THE PRINCIPLE INVESTIGATOR 
AND HER MENTOR. ONCE RESULTS HAVE BEEN LINKED FROM AGGREGATE FILES, 
IDENTIFYING INFORMATION WILL BE REMOVED, SUCH THAT NO ONE WILL VIEW NAMES 
ASSOCIATED WITH THE DATA. When information is used in research reports and journal articles, it is 
only done in a way that no one could know that the information is about any specific student. 
 
PLEASE KEEP THIS PORTION FOR YOUR RECORDS 
 
This project has been reviewed by the Human Subjects Protection Review Committee, 
which ensures that research projects involving human subjects follow federal regulations. 
Any questions or concerns about rights as a research subject should be directed to the 
chair of the Institutional Review Board, The University of Southern Mississippi, 118 
College Drive Box #5147, Hattiesburg, MS 39406, (601) 266-6820. 
 
I HAVE BEEN FULLY INFORMED OF THE ABOVE-DESCRIBED PROCEDURES 
WITH THEIR POSSIBLE BENEFITS AND RISKS, AND I GIVE PERMISSION FOR 
THE PARTICIPATION OF MY CHILD. 
 
Signature _______________________________________ Date ___________________ 
 
Printed Parent Name ________________________________ 
 
Name of Child _____________________________________ 
 
PLEASE RETURN THIS PORTION TO THE FACILITY 
 
Parent Child Questionnaire for LNEC12 Project 
 
*NECESSARY INFORMATION: 
 
*Child’s Name _________________________*Date of Birth____________________  
 
*Languages Spoken at 
Home:___________________________________________________________ 
 
*Does your child have any diagnosed language disorders (circle)?  Yes   or    No 
   
 If yes, please explain:_____________________________________________________ 
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*Does your child have any diagnosed intellectual disorders (circle)?  Yes   or    No 
  
 If yes, please explain:_____________________________________________________ 
 
Optional Information: 
 
Please indicate (by circling the appropriate response) your child’s birth order: 
 
 a)   Only child     d)   Third child 
 b)   First child     e)   Fourth child     
 c)   Second child 
 f)   Other: Explain 
______________________________________________________________ 
 
How many brothers and sisters (siblings) does your child have? Please list the ages of each: 
 
 a)   Full siblings and their ages: ______________________________________________ 
 
 b)   Half siblings and their ages: _____________________________________________ 
 
Please indicate the living arrangements in your home: 
 
 a)   Single mother home   c)   Two parent home 
 b)   Single father home   d)   Shared custody between parents 
 e)   Other: Explain ________________________________________________________  
 
What is your annual household income? 
 
 a)   Below $30,000    d)   $70,100 - $90,000 
 b)   $30,000 - $50,000    e)   Above $90,000 
 c)   $50,100 - $70,000 
 
What is the ethnic background of your child? 
 
 a)   Caucasian (white)    d)   Asian 
 b)   African American    e)   Native American 
 c)   Hispanic 
 f)   Other: Explain________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
PLEASE RETURN THIS PORTION TO THE FACILITY 
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APPENDIX C 
INFORMED ASSENT DOCUMENT GIVEN TO PARTICIPANTS 
 
University of Southern Mississippi 
Statement of Informed Assent 
 
Participant’s Name __________________________________ 
 
 The purpose of these activities is to help me learn more about you and how you 
think, so we can understand more about your brain. I am going to play some picture 
games with you on the computer that will show me how you put things into groups. 
 
 Some children may feel funny about doing some of these tasks. This is ok. You 
do not have to play the games if you do not want to. You can decide to stop working with 
me at any time, or to take a break whenever you want to. I will let you take a break 
between the different tasks. Also, the choices you make will not be shown to your 
teachers, parents, or friends. They will be completely private. 
 
 If you agree to help us with this study, please print your name on the line below. 
 
 
 
 
 
___________________________________  ______________________________ 
Your Name       Date  
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APPENDIX D 
INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARD NOTICE OF COMMITTEE ACTION 
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APPENDIX E 
PERMISSION TO REPRODUCE COPYRIGHTED ILLUSTRATIONS 
 
On Mon, Oct 13, 2014 at 11:45 AM, Stephanie Jett <stephanie.e.jett@gmail.com> wrote: 
 
Thank you, Dr. Russell! I very much appreciate it! 
 
Stephanie 
 
On Mon, Oct 13, 2014 at 11:42 AM, James Russell <james.russell@bc.edu> wrote: 
 
I am delighted to have you use the figures. 
 
James A. Russell 
Department of Psychology 
Boston College 
Chestnut Hill, MA  USA 
tel 617 552 4546 
fax 617 552 0523 
 
On Mon, Oct 13, 2014 at 11:40 PM, Stephanie Jett <stephanie.e.jett@gmail.com> wrote: 
 
Hello Dr. Russell, 
 
My name is Stephanie Jett and I have just completed defending my dissertation 
at the University of Southern Mississippi under the direction of Dr. Jennifer 
Vonk (Oakland University, Michigan) and Dr. Heidi Lyn (University of Southern 
Mississippi). My dissertation is on the effects of language on natural and emotion 
concept formation and I based one of my hypotheses on the Circumplex Model of 
emotion recognition. I am emailing you first, to express my admiration of your 
work, and secondly to ask permission to use a figure from two of your 
manuscripts in my dissertation. I would like to use Figure 1 from Russell and 
Bullock (1985, p. 1291), Figure 3 from Russell and Widen (2002, p. 38), and 
Figure 2 from Widen and Russell (2008, p.294). Please let me know as soon as 
possible if I can utilize the figure. I sincerely appreciate your time and assistance! 
Take care! 
  
Stephanie E. Jett, M.S. 
Comparative Cognition and Communication Lab 
University of Southern Mississippi Gulf Coast 
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